The military confrontation between Syria and Turkey in Syria's Idlib province is among the latest developments in Syria, which some believe it is very likely for the conflict to turn into a full-scale war. The Syrian government is currently trying to recapture the remaining territory of the country, which is controlled by Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish forces separately. The Syrian government's recent attempt to remove Idlib from the Turkish-backed insurgents has provoked Ankara's resistance, with Turkey taking military action against the Syrian army leading to a Damascus retaliation.
Dr. Daher believes Turkey needs to maintain its ties with Russia, so he does not want the situation to get tense any more. He stressed about the fate of the Syrian Kurds that they are in a very dire situation and it is unlikely that Damascus will accord to their demands, including the establishment of a federal system and the creation of an autonomous region in the Kurdish areas of the country.
The following is his full answers to Kurdpress questions;
There have been deadly attacks between Turkey and Syria forces in Idlib. How you see it and why Russia does not try to stop it?
Russia has been supporting Syrian regime’s armed forces in its offensive against Idlib. Moscow has repeated on several occasions that it supports politically and militarily the willingness of the Damascus to restore its sovereignty on the totality of the country.
On its side, Turkey has sent significant military reinforcements to Idlib Governorate and warned the Syrian regime’s armed forces that “all options are on the table” to stem their advance and push them to withdraw, while calling Syrian armed opposition forces to be ready to launch a military offensive on Damascus's troops in the area. Ankara has also not hesitated to retaliate strongly to all attacks of Syrian regime's armed forces on its soldiers. Syrian Armed opposition forces allied and backed by Turkey have according to the latest news reconquered the strategic city of Saraqeb. However, Turkey is in a difficult position, even as it wants to prevent a new arrival of refugees to Turkey from Idlib.
The Turkish army would have a clear military advantage in any large-scale confrontation with the Syrian regime AND COULD LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS IN SOME AREAS OF IDLIB AGAINST DAMASCUS' ARMED FORCES, but it wants to avoid increasing tensions and jeopardizing its relations with Russia. The killing of 33 Turkish soldiers by Russian-backed Syrian government troops of course increased considerably the tensions between the two actors.
Turkey since then has tried to push Europeans, notably through the issue of refugees, to support Ankara in its confrontations with Russia. However Western states have only brought rhetoric support to the Turkish governement.
However, despite Turkey’s hostile declarations against Moscow, on February 29th , Russia and Turkey have agreed to reduce tensions on the ground in Syria’s Idlib province while continuing military action there.
Moscow is the only actor capable of curbing Damascus’ potentially hostile actions against Turkish interests at any time. Turkey also wants to preserve its close relations with Russia because of Ankara’s deepening international isolation, especially with regard to Western and Middle Eastern powers, due to its Libyan venture and energy rivalry over hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, earlier this year the presidents of Turkey and Russia formally launched the TurkStream pipeline that will carry Russian natural gas to southern Europe through Turkey. Maintaining the relationship with Moscow is the main issue for Ankara. Moscow knows it and this is why it has moved forward in Idlib until now.
In addition to all this Russia’s military power is more important than Turkey and it controls the airspace in Syria.
Turkey’s calls for a new Sochi agreement with Russia and Iran, as it is losing ground after the regime’s conquest of new territories in Idlib, reflect in some ways the limited options it has in Syria.
Has the Idlib attack any effect on Syrian Kurd's destiny?
For the moment not directly, but in the future it might have.
Before there was indeed a kind of co-path between both territories and sort of political exchanges between Russia and Turkey.
However, one thing can be said, as the territories outside of the control of the Syrian regime, Damascus will increasingly focus on the territories dominated by the Syrian Democratic Forces. I will come back to this in the last question.
In addition to the problems encountered by Ankara with Moscow mentioned above, there are several challenges for Turkish army to pursue a military offensive in the north east. First, the remaining of US presence in the region. Secondly, cornered, and convinced their American partner would not protect them against the Turkish offensive, the SDF concluded a military agreement with Damascus on 14 October under Russian auspices. The agreement authorised the return of limited numbers of Syrian troops to areas near the Turkish border. So, while Turkey did compel the US to pull back and to implicitly condone the operation, it also led to the deployment of Russian and Syrian forces in the border strip.
The Kurdish movement seems to have capitulated, allowing a return of the Syrian regime to a region it had abandoned seven years previously. Although destabilised, the movement has not been truly defeated and it still holds several cards in a game which is increasingly complex for all the actors involved. It retains control of territory, military forces, oil resources and governance structures, all of which allow it to maintain an alternative political order still functioning after the return of a regime more drained than ever.
However these challenges could be overcome in a new rapprochement in the future between Turkey and Syria through Russian mediation, although this will not occur in the short term especially after the latest events in Idlib and deep differences between Moscow and Ankara.
But a possible return of a form of Adana agreement is possible in the future to crush the Kurdish movement, just as in the past. Before the latest offensive in Idlib, Turkey and Syrian official security services officially met and discussed of the Kurdish issue.
We saw also some skirmishes between Russia and U.S forces in Northern Syria in recent weeks. how you analyze it?
Some small skirmishes might have occurred, but real confrontation appears out of the question between the two forces. Washington and Moscow don’t want to see any escalation.
While the United States and Russia disagree in political outlook and diplomacy, although sharing some common elements such as the remaining of the regime, the two actually operate in the same space and coordinate military and politically. Phone lines on “de-confliction” and “de-escalation” connect the two. Their movements are not unknown to each other either.
The election of Trump did not change the strategic positioning of Washington over Syria (the priority was still the war on terror and maintaining the structures of the regime), despite a more aggressive and firm policy toward the Assad regime to make it respect the boundaries set by the US administration. Iran’s influence in some regions of Syria was also checked. Washington did not hesitate to bomb the Syrian regime’s military bases or forces on several occasions
Despite the confusion over Trump’s strategy in Syria, US policy did not radically change towards the Assad regime throughout Obama’s and Trump’s early mandates, focusing on a political transition favouring stability and the maintenance of the regime’s structures, as well as the war on terror. The major difference was Trump’s focus on opposition to Iran and seeing its influence diminished in Syria.
Syrian Kurds before October 2019 were controlling nearly one-third of Syrian territory, but at the present, they only have access to some areas in northeastern Syria. can these oil-rich areas Save the Kurds?
Well it is certain that the oil production in these areas, alongside other economic and financial resources (internal and external), have enabled the Kurdish led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to develop an imposing bureaucratic apparatus with more than 250,000 employees, including 70,000 soldiers, 30,000 police and 150,000 civil servants. Among the latter, 40,000 are teachers receiving a monthly salary of 120-200 US dollars, double the amount paid in the territory controlled by the regime. The military are also better remunerated in comparison with the regime- controlled areas.
However, this will not be enough to protect these areas from the regime and its allies of Russia and Iran on one side or Turkey on the other.
There has been some negotiating between Kurds and Damascus. Can Kurds reach an agreement with Damascus? is there any hope for stablishing a Kurdish self-governed in Syria?
Bashar al-Assad and other officials have accused the PYD of being a “US stooge” and “tool” and have said they will “crush it,” considering Raqqa (former Da’esh capital, now PYD-held) to be occupied territory. In Afrin, for instance, the Russians pushed the PYD to make a deal with the regime, saying “if you remove all your heavy weapons and give in to the regime, Turkey will not come in and invade this area.” The PYD refused, and the result was the Turkish occupation of Afrin in 2018.
Even if there are now negotiations, the regime has refused any kind of conditions put by the PYD for federalism or decentralization.
However, faced with regional and international pressures on the one hand, more especially of Turkey, but also Russia, and by the regime’s increasing willingness to reconquer all of Syria on the other, PYD officials more and more sought a form of reconciliation with Damascus to maintain its institutions and preserve its organizational structure within the country in these past few years. However, as SDF officials themselves recognized, major challenges stand in the way of future talks — notably the continuous absence of recognition of Kurdish rights and a federal political system.
Despite continuing talks, regime officials did not accept any of the conditions of the PYD, while state officials and the media continue to attack the Kurdish Party. The PYD has been seeking Russian mediation for talks with Damascus in order to prevent any invasion of Turkish forces against the regions they controlled, without much success. Russia has declared on numerous occasions that the Syrian regime must take control of the country’s northern provinces, notably to regain control of Syria’s oil reserves.
As I have said on many occasions, just as the rise of the uprising in Syria had pushed the regime to seek occasional and temporal agreements with the PYD, this threat was increasingly disappearing as its position strengthened and it recovered new territories with the assistance of its allies. The regime, therefore, could once more turn its forces against Kurdish inhabited regions or increasingly undermine its autonomy, especially with international actors, Russia and the United States, progressively abandoning the Kurdish group as their objectives differed from the latter after periods of collaborations. Turkey’s latest invasion in October 2019 reduced even more the PYD’s control.
As we have seen, the destiny of the Kurdish people in Syria was inextricably linked to the causes and conditions of the Syrian uprising. Therefore, their future is in danger and facing multiple threats, similar to the rest of the protest movement.
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