Dr. Ben Priest is one of the researchers who has conducted a lot of studies on the Kurdish issues and political Islam. Dr. Priest is fluent in Sorani dialect of the Kurdish language and holds Kurdish language courses at the American University of Indiana. He is interested in teaching Kurdish, and the outbreak of coronavirus has not prevented him from holding his Kurdish Sorani course at the University of Indiana, which he has held online during the summer season this year.

Dr. Ben Priest is very interested in two issues of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam, and is currently focusing on these two issues. For the reason, KurdPress News Agency has asked him questions about these issues.

The professor at the University of Indiana believes that Islamic Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan region are unable to take power in this region because they are unable to form a political majority and demographic changes in this region will not change in their favor in the future. He, however, emphasizes that the major Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan region, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are trying to maintain their relationship with the Islamic parties.

Dr. Ben Priest expressed his hope for improved relations between the Kurdish region and the central government of Iraq in the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. The researcher believes that the United States will not leave the Kurdistan region but rather seeks to consolidate its presence in the region.

There are at least two main Islamist parties that have considerable MPs in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament. How do you describe the role of these parties in the Kurdistan Region’s affairs?

The relationship between the Islamic parties in the KRG and larger parties, namely the KDP, PUK, and Gorran, is one of co-construction. On a personal level, I know that leaders of those large parties would just as soon be rid of the Islamists entirely. However, there are too many Kurds that either support them directly or have some degree of sympathy for them for that to be a possibility. Particularly in areas such as Ranya, Halabja, and smaller border areas like Tawila, there are a lot of Kurds that have expressed their feeling that none of the larger parties care for them and that the Islamists represent their views better. As such, they’re a permanent part of the Iraqi Kurdish ecosystem, and must be taken account of anytime the larger parties are trying to consolidate support. A perfect example of this came in the aftermath of the 2017 Referendum. One of the very first stops that President Nechirvan Barzani made was to Ali Bapir. While he was clearly in the top echelons of those being groomed for the office and already had relationships with all of the relevant parties and players, it was important for him to be seen speaking with Kurdish Islamists.

Can the Islamist parties rule over the Kurdistan Region one day?

The short answer is no. There will never be a majority of Iraqi Kurds comfortable with having Islamists occupying the most important positions in government. While Islam is sufficiently embedded to be a permanent part of society, mainstream manifestations of Islamic identity within Kurdistan are significantly less conservative than many neighboring regions and political discourse in the KRG regularly features debates regarding what the role of Islam is and should (or should not) be.

One of the main factors that contributes to the perpetuation of Islamist parties in the KRG is that, despite the relative lateness of Islamic influence in Kurdistan, Islamic tradition still informs a great many social expectations. For instance, I listened to Rudaw radio (nominally the mouthpiece of the KDP) throughout Ramadan in 2018. Similar to radio programs all over the Islamic world, it was characterized by religious discussions, biographies of Islamic scholars, etc. This was hardly surprising. However, the day after Ramadan ended, I turned on the radio and the first item up was a program discussing homoerotic literature in the West and Middle East. No more ‘ilhamdulillah’s, no more talk of zakāt – just back to business as usual. It was like they simply turned on the piety switch for when it was expected, then turned it off and put it back on the shelf where it would stay until the next religious observance.

I don’t mean this as a judgment of their piety; this is not my place and I’m disinterested in antagonizing anyone over what they believe or how they elect to live it. I never saw a Friday in Hawler where the mosque didn’t fill up, but for most citizens, Islam is not necessarily the utmost portion of their conscious identities. Having spoken to many Kurdish youth in both Hewler and Slemani, I can tell you for a surety that there are a good many in the upcoming generation that were children during the Iraqi civil war and teens during the war against Da’esh, and these youth are, at best, conflicted respecting the role of religion in politics. Many have told me the whole experience has made them profoundly non-religious, associating political Islam with the violence that surrounded them their whole lives.

There are youth that buck this trend, some small number having even joined extremist groups, but these are several standard deviations from the norm. The Islamic parties, even if they were to set aside their differences to form a single party as opposed to splitting seats between Yekgirtū, Komala and even smaller parties, they will only ever represent a non-majority in the KRG. I don’t see the demographics shifting away from this.

Erbil and Baghdad had a good relationship during the campaign against ISIS, can the new government by Mostafa Al-Kadhimi come over differences with Erbil?

I have a feeling that part of this consolidation process in Iraq will include a more genial relationship between Erbil and Baghdad for a time, particularly while the pandemic continues to keep business from resuming as normal. On the one hand, everyone involved knows that longer term cooperation will be required to keep Da’esh or something just like it from reemerging. On the other, it’s easier for Turkey and Iran in particular to play Baghdad and Hewler off of each other; a less unified Iraq is a weaker Iraq, and weaker partners are easier to push. We’ll have to see how much autonomy from neighboring governments al-Kadhimi manages to keep. However, it is promising that with his record of being less friendly toward Iran, he managed to form a government when others could not.

How do you assess the new round of negotiation between the U.S and Iraqi government over the U.S presence in Iraq? will the U.S leave Iraq and Kurdistan Region?

For as tumultuous and unpredictable as the US has been with regard to its position in the KRG, Iraq, and the Middle East in general, I have no reason to believe that US would pull out of Iraqi Kurdistan. The addition of four new American bases in the KRG is proof of this long-term commitment. I am hopeful that this will inculcate better relations between our two governments.

For as much pressure as the central Iraqi government has been receiving over the presence of Western forces in their country, they are a necessary balance to Iranian influence, when the Iraqi parliament vote regarding the presence of American troops an anonymous vote as opposed to an open one, I suspect there are parliamentarians, even among the Iraqi Shi’ites, that would have sided against advocating expulsion.

I suspect American analysts are keeping these factors in mind during the current negotiations and are not being overly pessimistic regarding their capacity to counter future actions in Iraq.

How do you describe the Iraqis and West's attitude towards the Kurdistan Region after the 2017 independence referendum?

Unfortunately, American policies have been dictated in large part by an administration that has vacillated massively, stating that they’ll use American hard and soft power in Iraq and elsewhere, then doing something entirely different. For example, prior to the Battle of Kirkuk in 2017, the Trump administration made itself out as being staunchly anti-Iranian, yet they did nothing when militias used American equipment (most prominently Abrams tanks) to go right through KDP and PUK Peshmerga (that remained with Kosrat Rasul). As a result, the KRG saw the need to keep an open dialogue with American forces and while also opening up far more to Russian investment (namely Rosneft, which had been working on opening relations for some time before the referendum).

In many respects, everything post-2017 can be seen as the KRG trying to work itself out of a position of weakness – namely, dealing with the massive debt accrued throughout the war against Da’esh and the loss of political capital after 2017. Despite the fact that most everyone in the region wishes to see Da’esh disappear, I’ve heard Iraqis, Jordanians, and others from the Middle East describe the Referendum as a power grab and the Kurds as “bullies” trying to take more than their share. I’m uncertain how the pandemic has altered this perception, as most all reporting has been domestically focused.

Following the events of 2017 and the various evacuations of American troops that exposed Syrian Kurdish groups to Turkish attack during Operations Olive Branch and Peace Spring in 2018 and 2019, I heard and read many Kurds express the sentiment that they “would/should never trust America ever again!” While I understand where this comes from, the truth is far more subject to the Kurdish aphorism, “siyāsat na bāwk na dāyik niya” – politics have no permanent allegiances, and things can and do change, sometimes with great speed. The Trump administration has certainly undermined trust in the integrity of American promises and protection (in the KRG and the world in general), but times and circumstances change. Faced with another threat like Da’esh, I have no doubt the KRG would accept American assistance, no matter how fickle American domestic pressures might be.

Reporter’s code: 50101