The situation of the Kurds in Syria has altered after the Turkish attacks in 2018 and 2019, which made the Kurds lose several important areas under their control in the north. Syria's Kurds currently do not have any movements along the northern border of Syria with Turkey which is currently under the control of Turkish forces, Turkish threat remains unchanged, the future of the US presence in Syria and its support of the Kurds is quite unclear, and the Kurds have not reached an agreement with the central government on areas under their control.

The Kurdish self-ruling system is under the control the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its affiliated parties. Meanwhile, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), which is close to the Syrian opposition and the Turkish government, wants its share of power in the region. Months ago, the two Kurdish movements in Syria began US-brokered talks to get united. Kurdpress agency interviewed Dr. Michael Karadjis, a professor at Western Sydney University College, to discuss the issues.

Referring to the problems the Kurds are dealing with in controlling the self-ruling administration, he said that “the Kurdish self-determination has many enemies, among them Turkey. Both Russia and the US are willing to deal with the Kurds but they most understand that this mainly concerns their strategic interests, rather than any commitment to the Kurds. Russia, in particular, is both the main backer of the Syrian government, while also is seeking to have increasing ties with Turkey, though Russia’s commitment to Turkey is probably no stronger than its sometimes dealings with the Kurds. At this point, that leaves the US as the most consistent backer, despite Trump’s quite cynical betrayals in the face of deals with Erdogan.”

“In the circumstances, therefore, allying with the US is logical. But the US has never expressed any support for Kurdish self-determination either. What this means is that the Kurds need to watch their back; the US has certain objectives it wants to achieve in Syria and if some kind of deal is made, perhaps together with Russia, for example an acceptable replacement of Assad to stabilize the regime, then the US may offer little protection of the Kurds. At best, it may push for some better form of Kurdish rights than in the past, but there are no signals that it would aim to protect full Kurdish autonomy,” he said about the relation of the Kurds with Russia and the U.S.

He stressed that the Kurds are entangled in a very difficult situation and “The SDF and Rojava authorities therefore cannot be blamed for maneuvering between the US, Russia and the Assad regime; with Trump allowing Turkey to rampage into the northeast (and previously Afrin), and Assad offering his terms for protection against Turkey as Kurdish surrender, it is a hard bargain.”

“The deal the SDF made with Assad for SAA troops to enter the northeast in late 2019 was inevitable once Turkey marched in, but is also a potential death warrant. It is all the worse considering that the Kurds’ Arab allies in the SDF, in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, will fight to the bone to prevent Assad’s forces returning; and this could mean conflict between Kurdish and Arab components of the northeast,” the professor told KurdPress about the ties between the Kurdish administration and the Syrian government after Turkey attacks in October 2019.

“Obviously another important ally of Kurds is other Kurds! While there is nothing remarkable about the Kurdish nation being divided into different political parties – this is entirely natural – when the nation is oppressed this division does give the anti-Kurdish, and self-interested, powers more tools to manoeuvre with, to divide and rule. So any moves towards greater cooperation should be welcome,” the professor said about divisions between the PYD and the ENKS on the way to control Rojava.

About the US intention in mediating between the Kurds, he said: “I cannot say for sure, but it seems to me that the US aim is to build a more solid constituency through which to exert pressure to have some influence over the eventual outcome in Syria. The only possible “entry point”, therefore, for US influence on the Syrian outcome is via its Kurdish-led allies. However, in other respects, this USD/PYD relationship isn’t so natural; the US still classifies the PKK in Turkey as a “terrorist” organization, and its relationship with the PYD in Syria has strained relations with Turkey, officially a NATO ally – and unofficially, a potential spoiler in Syria.

“Turkey is less hostile to the Kurdish National Council (KNC); even though the KNC has condemned Turkey’s anti-Kurdish invasions, at least the KNC is not connected to the leading force among Kurdish resistance in Turkey as is the PYD. The KNC also has good relations with the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, which Turkey has long worked with. By trying to draw the two major Syrian Kurdish blocs together, therefore, the US aims to strengthen its metaphorical “voting bloc” in Syria, while also hoping to encounter less Turkish resistance to the strategy.”

“While the US may only be looking after its own interests in this, it also has advantages for the Kurds; because, as I noted above, the Kurds will have to watch their backs from all directions as a political solution arises, if they are less divided among themselves they will be in a better position to push for a relatively better outcome for Kurdish freedom in a new Syria,” he ultimately told KurdPress about the benefits of the Kurdish unity project in Syria.

Reporter’s code: 50101