It is only when something such as the suspension of major flows of oil from Kurdistan to Turkey occurs, as began on 25 March, that many analysts start trying to unravel what has caused it. And they find themselves entering an ‘Alice In Wonderland’ world in which anything is possible, but nothing is as it seems. It is in this world, then, a step back should be taken, to answer precisely why the suspension is in place and when it will end.

Such a step back reveals clearly that the FGI – supported by Iran – does not want Iraq’s Kurdistan region to have any true autonomy. Shutting down the KRG’s ability to generate its own significant revenues through the sale of oil independently of the FGI is simply part of efforts to deny the region this independence. Sustained over a long enough period, Baghdad and Iran – and Russia and China too – believe that the Kurdistan region can rolled back into the rest of Iraq to all meaningful intents and purposes. The drive towards this reintegration was stepped up by Baghdad and Tehran dramatically stepped up their efforts to achieve this after the 2017 independence vote in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is apposite to note that the vote on independence for Iraq’s Kurdistan region only occurred through pressure from the U.S., as analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. Specifically, Washington had privately assured the Iraqi Kurds in 2014 that in exchange for their Peshmerga armed forces taking the principal combat role against a surging ISIS, they would eventually be given their own independent country. Although the 2017 independence did not automatically grant Iraqi Kurdistan its independence from Baghdad, it was seen by the U.S. as a litmus test of how such an independent Kurdistan would be received in the region. As it transpired, the 92.73 percent vote on 25 September 2017 in favour of Kurdish independence went down extremely badly with the remainder of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The key reason for this was that each of these countries had sizeable Kurdish populations themselves – Iran 9 percent, Syria 10 percent, and Turkey 18 percent - and the thought was that if the Iraqi Kurds successfully gained independence from Iraq then their own Kurdish populations might try to do the same. 

Consequently, the 2017 Iraq Kurdistan independence vote was immediately followed by elements of Iran’s military rolling into Iraq Kurdistan, including the prime oil-rich areas. Additionally, very senior officers from Iran’s Quds branch of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, and from its Vezarat-e Ettela'at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran intelligence service, made it clear to several of Iraq Kurdistan’s leading politicians that it would not be in their best interests to continue to push for independence from Iraq.  At the same time, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a top military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called for a blockade on Iraq Kurdistan’s land borders. Turkish President then as now, Recep Erdogan, also threatened to invade the Iraqi Kurdish area. He added that Turkey could also cut off the oil export pipeline from Iraq to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. At that point, the region was producing around an average of 500,000-600,000 bpd of oil exports, by far the mainstay of Iraq Kurdistan’s economy.

It was then that Russia stepped in, taking effective control of all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key means. First, it provided the KRG with US$1.5 billion in financing through forward oil sales payable in the next three to five years. Second, it took an 80 percent working interest in five potentially major oil blocks in the region. And third, it established 60 percent ownership of the vital KRG oil pipeline to Ceyhan in Turkey by dint of a commitment to invest US$1.8 billion to increase its capacity to one million barrels per day. Over and above specific oil and gas exploration and development opportunities, Russia saw an opportunity to leverage its new-found influence in Iraq Kurdistan into the rest of Iraq too. Already active in several oil fields in Iraq, it wanted to expand this presence, including into those with significant gas resources. Russia also wanted to support the already extensive influence in Iraq of one of its key allies in the region, Iran. The principal method it used as leverage was the ‘oil-for-budget disbursements’ deal done between the KRG and FGI back in 2014. By ensconcing itself first in the heart of Iraq Kurdistan and then in the key role of negotiator in the oil-for-budget disbursements deal with the FGI, Russia could ensure that the KRG was under its effective control, and that the government in Baghdad would fall into line at some point, as also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. At the end of 2020/beginning of 2021, China stepped into Iraq to support Russia’s efforts, as also analysed in my book, using the same strategy in Baghdad as Russia had used in 2017 with the KRG. 

By Simon Watkins

Oil Price