The vote was originally due to take place in 2022, but disagreements about the electoral system led to multiple postponements. At the heart of this lies the demise of the power-sharing arrangement between the ruling duopoly of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which has been in charge of the region since it gained a measure of autonomy in 1991. Increasingly, however, the two parties are at loggerheads. 
Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the KRI was hailed for its relative peace and prosperity. The KDP and the PUK signed a power-sharing agreement to merge their two separate administrations, which had developed after a civil war in the 1990s. The arrangement entailed an equal split in government positions in the region and federal Iraq, while allowing for compromises and trade-offs. Preservation of the balance of power vis-à-vis the other party remained the ultimate goal.
The arrangement brought much-needed political stability to the region, while the rest of Iraq descended into sectarian civil war in the wake of the invasion. The KRI remained quiescent and began to prosper. Having temporarily resolved their internal divisions, the Kurdish leaders became critical players in the “new Iraq” by helping draft a constitution that enshrined the region’s semiautonomous status within a federal system. KDP and PUK leaders mediated Shia-Sunni tensions and disagreements about power sharing under the new consociational system. For example, Kurdish-led efforts helped broker the political deal that famously offered Nouri al-Maliki a second term as Iraqi prime minister in 2010.
The elections also come in the context of decades-long disputes between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) blames its misfortunes on concerted efforts by Shia forces to shrink Kurdish autonomy. Ongoing KDP and PUK divisions have further complicated Erbil-Baghdad relations and, at times, led to gridlock in Baghdad or gave it an opportunity to interfere in internal Kurdish affairs. Several Federal Supreme Court rulings over the past two years have further restricted Kurdish autonomy. A significant ruling in February, which stemmed from a lawsuit brought by the PUK about the region’s election law, prompted the KDP to accuse the court of overstepping its mandate and violating the spirit of the constitution.
The demise of power sharing between the KDP and the PUK, and their increasingly fraught relationship, is partly due to the rise of a new generation of leaders within both parties. They often seem unwilling or unable to find a compromise. Many perceive their inability to present a unified front in Baghdad as a major reason for their reduced leverage.
The KDP has been ascendant in recent years. In response, the PUK has increasingly drifted to Baghdad to counterbalance its rival’s power. The two parties have been in a power-sharing coalition since 2006, but this arrangement has become increasingly fraught in the wake of the 2017 independence referendum. Since then, the KDP has accused the PUK of losing the disputed territories—including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, the 300-mile-long swath of territory stretching from the Iranian to the Syrian border, and the transitional zone between Arab and Kurdish Iraq—following the referendum.
In 2014, the KRG brought the territories under its control after Iraqi security forces withdrew in the face of advances by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) fighters. However, the two parties each remain the only game in town in their respective strongholds, and the legacy of the civil war still looms large.
Despite these disputes, the PUK under the leadership of Bafel Talabani seems to have finally achieved party unity for the first time in more than two decades. Intra-party rivalries and power struggles in the past have led to internal fragmentation and the rise of splinter groups, most notably the Gorran Movement (or Movement for Change) in 2009. The major challenge for the PUK in these elections is to prove its mettle on two fronts. First, it must secure its stronghold in the eastern part of the Kurdistan region. It is facing a fresh challenge from its former co-leader, Lahur Talabani, who established the People’s Front after his ouster from the PUK in 2021.
The new party pledges decentralization within the region and combating corruption and abuse by the ruling parties. Talabani’s background in the security establishment might help him sway voters among the security apparatus of his old party. Additionally, the PUK must convince voters that it will correct the course of governance in the region by checking the dominance of the KDP.
Nevertheless, the general public’s mood is one of apathy and weariness. Voters do not seem eager, and overall disenchantment with politics has risen. People’s living conditions have deteriorated over the last decade, and the government has often been unable to make payroll. The turnout rate will likely be low as the opposition parties struggle to sway undecided voters. Still, there is a growing fatigue with the region’s two ruling parties. Unemployment has been on the rise, particularly among the youth, leaving a stream of young people risking everything to migrate to Europe.
The changes in the electoral system that divided the Kurdish Region of Iraq into four constituencies, replacing the single constituency system and reallocating the seats (along with the reserved minority seats) to the region’s four provinces, could lead to some redistribution in vote share and seats in the next parliament. That being said, the KDP could preserve its plurality vote due to its internal party discipline and cohesion.
Major questions hang over the government formation process following the election on October 20. Given the two main parties’ growing inability to compromise, it will likely be long and fraught, leading to inertia and missteps. The stakes are high, but so is the risk of political deadlock in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The Atlantic Council