Will Erdogan come out victorious once more, and, regarding the elections as referendum for his rule, perceive such a result as a new “carte blanche”? Or, will the ballot box turn against him and his allies? What are possible scenarios on Turkey’s tumultuous political stage?
In an extensive essay published by the German think tank SWP, Berk Esen seeks answers to a number of questions. Dr Esen is a PC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP.
A shortened version of the article follows.
After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdogan is not the clear favourite. Six oppo­sition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdogan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy.
Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdogan's ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdogan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of estab­lishing a meri­tocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey's diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance's diverse com­position, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections.
Due to Turkey's growing economic crisis, which has resulted in high inflation and unemployment rates, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) has experienced a sharp fall in opinion polls over the past year. Even with support from the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is part of the People's Alliance with the AKP, Erdogan seems to have dif­ficulty reaching the 50 per cent of the vote share necessary to win the presidential elections.
By contrast, potential con­tenders among the opposition camp have begun to surpass Erdogan in a one-to-one match, according to most opinion polls. More importantly, the opposition camp, led by the centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP), is more united than at any point under Erdogan's rule. The two splinter par­ties that broke off from the AKP – the Future Party (GP) of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) of former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan – are acting together with the Nation Alliance, which is composed of the Turkish nationalist Good Party (IYIP), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the centre-right Democrat Party (DP).
Obviously, Erdogan would not go down without a fight. Due to his control of a large portion of the media, the opposition parties should be ready for a highly polarising con­test. The ruling bloc already has access to a disproportionate level of public and private resources and uses bureaucracy as a par­tisan auxiliary force. To gain support from nationalist voters in the opposition ranks, Erdogan could resort to a new wave of repres­sion against Kurdish groups, includ­ing a ban of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) by the Constitutional Court, and initiate a cross-border military campaign in Syria to rally public opinion behind his candidacy.
Although the opposition bloc has risen in opinion polls, many analysts are worried that Erdogan may actively manipulate or contest the results on election night.
Inter­national observers have already documented electoral irregularities in previous elections that placed the ruling bloc at an advantage over its rivals. In cases where the government lost the election despite such favour­able conditions, it relied on partisan deci­sions of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) to reverse the electoral outcomes, as was the case in the repeat of the 2019 Istan­bul mayoral race after the pro-government candidate's surprising defeat.
Due to heavy government control over the bureaucracy, judiciary and media, opposition parties will face a skewed playing field against Erdogan. In such cases, a smooth transfer of power is hardly guar­anteed. For Erdogan, resorting to outright electoral manipulation, which can be easily detected by opposition parties and outside observers, would be a risky, though not unfeasible, strategy.
Electoral fraud would risk further excluding Turkey from Western markets and deepen­ing the economic downturn, which would hit Erdogan's base severely. Turkey is already confronted with a major currency and debt crisis that was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Nominal GDP fell to $815 billion in 2021, from its peak of $958 billion in 2013. The economic down­turn has limited the regime's ability to finance social assis­tance programmes for the urban poor – its voter base – and funnel resources to its busi­ness allies.
Electoral fraud might – and can – occur in Turkey, where the opposition camp in­cludes a diverse mix of political actors rang­ing from moderate Islamists and secular parties to Turkish and Kurdish nationalists.
Some fear that, in response to opposition protests, Erdogan could mobilise his own base, as he did against the putschist forces during the coup attempt in 2016. Were Erdogan to adopt this strategy, the ruling bloc could tap into groups that are affiliated with the regime.
The AKP has millions of party mem­bers across the country and enjoys strong ties with other popular groups, such as the Ottoman Hearths and a military contractor company (SADAT) established by retired conservative officers. SADAT, which is accused of training paramilitary groups in Libya and Syria, could be used against opposition protesters.
It is not certain that Erdogan enjoys the full support of the security apparatus, whose unquestioned loyalty would be vital to put down popular protests in the after­math of the election.
The police forces, whose ranks have expanded dramatically over the past decade, are seen as a partisan body and are tightly controlled by the Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu.
Faced with allegations of close ties to organised crime groups, Soylu has a strong incentive to oppose a government turnover, which could pave the way for his prosecution.
Mean­while, the military's compliance in the event of a massive crackdown is not guaranteed. While post-coup purges have brought the armed forces under tighter civilian control, the Turkish military, as a conscription force, may refrain from clash­ing directly with citizens.
Any public con­frontation involving the armed forces would highlight the importance of the positioning of the defence minister and former chief of general staff Hulusi Akar, who has retained his autonomy under the current regime.
There is a good chance that the ruling bloc will lose its parliamentary majority. Even some pro-government analysts have begun to openly admit the possibility that Erdogan may win the presi­dency but face a parliament dominated by opposition parties.
Under the current presidential system, the president does not need parliamentary approval to form a cabinet and could govern the country with­out strong checks from the legislature.
Should Erdogan win the presidency, he could co-opt MPs from conservative parties that are currently part of the opposition bloc to hinder the effective functioning of the parliament. Under a continued Erdogan presidency, the two splinter parties that broke off from the AKP would run the risk of keeping their cadres intact.
In the event of an opposition victory in the presidential elections, some MPs from the AKP and the MHP may likewise decide to switch sides. Under both scenarios, the parliamentary arith­metic is expected to change in the post-election period depending on who wins the presidency.
The composition of the parliament is difficult to predict based on opinion polls. The ruling People's Alliance and the oppo­sition-led Nation Alliance are locked in a fierce electoral competition.
In a close elec­tion, the number of seats allocated to these alliances would be determined by the deci­sion of alliance parties to prepare joint lists under the two main parties in it – namely the CHP and IYIP – or contest the elections on their own.
Another factor that will influence the parliamentary composition is the presence of other alliances that can offer viable alternatives.
The HDP, which won 11.7 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, maintains its electoral support, according to most opin­ion polls. With the help of a third alliance with smaller left-wing parties, the HDP could thus emerge as the key party that holds the balance among the two large blocs in a hung parliament.
Also, against the backdrop of rising anti-refugee sentiment, the far-right populist Victory Party (ZP) would spoil the opposition vote if it attracts opposition voters, but the party fails to muster the 7 per cent necessary to cross the parliamentary threshold.
A more worrisome scenario for Erdogan would be to lose the presidency to a candi­date endorsed by the Nation Alliance. If current opinion polls are to be trusted, Erdogan is expected to lose against all three of the opposition's potential joint candidates, namely CHP chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas.
Losing the presidency would be a huge blow for Erdogan, who would be deprived of access to public resources to run the AKP machine. Given his frail health and advanced age, Erdogan might not be able to muster the strength to lead his party in opposition for long.
Although his party has commanded strong electoral support, even at the height of the economic crisis, its future after Erdogan is uncertain.
The ruling party has recently become a personalistic movement with very weak institutions. Although pre­dic­tions of its demise are premature, the AKP would have a difficult time keeping its base intact in opposition.
If Erdogan is defeated in the upcoming elec­tions, his successor will face a set of severe challenges. The opposition bloc has cam­paigned on a democratisation platform that envisions a speedy return to the parliamentary system and the restoration of the rule of law.
Although details have not yet been fully formulated, the six parties have pledged to transfer the extensive powers of the presidency to the parliament. Whoever is picked as their joint candidate will be ex­pected to sign this pledge and refrain from fully exercising his or her powers, if elected.
However, the new government's most press­ing problem will be to pull Turkey out of its current economic predicament and put the country on a trajectory of sustainable devel­op­ment. The six opposition parties have already announced their commitment to macroeconomic stability, central bank in­dependence, and tight monetary policy. Each of these parties has an impressive line-up of economists who could form a strong recovery team.
IYIP recruited Bilge Yilmaz, professor of finance from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, who recently unveiled a comprehensive economic package that in­cludes detailed measures on public finance, tax systems, industrial policy, and international trade.
DEVA has sought to capitalise on the strong performance of its leader, Ali Babacan, under whose term as economy minister Turkey experienced high growth.
The looming question is to decide which party gets the economics portfolio under the new government. Announcing their eco­nomic programmes early, IYIP and DEVA seem to be in open competition to attract voters hard hit by the crisis and want to get the political credit for pulling Turkey out of it.
Surprisingly, the CHP has taken a back seat in these debates. Al­though the "Table of Six" laid out the steps to ad­dress the cur­rency and budgetary crisis, this weak per­formance by the CHP – as the only leftist party in the alliance – risks weakening the ability of the new government to adopt re­distributive and anti-poverty measures.
Another important issue to tackle for the new government would be the replacement of partisans in civil service, the military, and the judiciary. Especially since the failed 2016 coup, the Erdogan administration has purged tens of thousands of public officials and replaced them with sycophants who became complicit in the partisan and re­pres­sive measures adopted by the ruling bloc.
If these cadres were to keep their posi­tions, the new government would encoun­ter resistance against its political agenda, experience bureaucratic obstruction, and even run the risk of military insubordination.
Although the six opposition parties ac­knowledge the need for change, they dis­agree on how and with whom to replace these posts.
Naturally, the main opposition CHP expects the lion's share in bureau­cratic appointments. Due to the exclusion of social democratic cadres under AKP rule, the CHP does not have a sizeable pool of recruits.
Therefore, major metropolitan mu­nicipalities in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, where CHP mayors are in charge, could emerge as the centre-left party's primary source of recruitment in a post-Erdogan era. Faced with limited financial sources and government obstruction, the opposition cadres in these cities have gained invaluable experience in undertaking large infra­structure projects, providing social assis­tance, and running integration programmes for migrants, among others.
After nearly two decades of AKP rule, few government critics have any significant experience in public office, with the excep­tion of some members of the two Islamist splinter parties. Owing to the fact that they were established by former AKP members, the leadership of both parties still enjoy ties to the state bureaucracy and may also advo­cate for the reinstatement of former AKP-era cadres who were purged by Erdoğan over the years.
IYiP may also have an ideo­logical advantage that could appeal to cer­tain segments of the bureaucracy, particularly those in the security apparatus.
Due to the AKP's alliance with the ultranationalist MHP, state ranks have recently been filled by nationalist recruits who may gravitate towards the IYIP after a government turnover.
Faced with these challenges, the “Table of Six” has not yet offered a comprehensive policy platform. On matters of economic policy, judicial reform, and refugee manage­ment, the six parties have recently begun to converge their positions.
Even if these parties were to settle on common positions, recovery would require tough decisions in the post-election period. On the other hand, the six parties are divided on matters of foreign affairs, politi­cal and bureaucratic appointments, and the Kurdish question, among others.
These rifts may intensify if the six parties begin to com­pete against each other following Erdogan's defeat. While tackling these problems, the six parties would also need to amend the constitution to restore the parliamen­tary system.
This would be a tough task to accomplish, considering that the record of coalition governments in Turkey is not very strong.
No coalition government has managed to com­plete its full term since Turkey's transition to a multi-party democ­racy in 1950.
Another challenge for the new government will be restoring Turkey's foreign policy. Erdogan's revisionist agenda has led to frequent clashes with the EU, brought into question Turkey's position within NATO, and strained ties with various countries in the region. Although Erdogan has recently sought rapprochement with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, Turkey's interna­tional standing has been shaken severely over the past decade. The new government is expected to strengthen Turkey's position within NATO and reset EU-Turkey relations.
After years of continuous tensions in EU-Turkish relations, Erdogan's departure from power would generate some goodwill among European governments, but the im­provement of bilateral relations would take a long time.
In particular, the status of Cyprus, maritime borders with Greece, and the migration deal will continue to plague bilateral relations with the EU.
The opposition does not have a new vision for recalibrating Turkey's relations with either Russia or Iran, both of which have determined their diplomatic policy on Turkey based on personal ties to Erdogan.
The complicated triangle between Turkey, Russia, and Iran would also affect Turkey-Syria relations in a post-Erdoğan era. Both the CHP and IYIP have indicated their willingness to talk with the al-Assad regime.
The six opposition parties have vastly different agendas that would complicate efforts to develop a consistent diplomatic course. The CHP's foreign policy portfolio is currently run by Unal Cevikoz, a former diplomat with moderate Western leanings who advocates for a return to Turkey's tra­di­tional foreign policy agenda.
But on con­tro­versial issues, such as the Russian-made S-400 missile defence systems and the eastern Mediter­ranean disputes, Cevikoz has met with strong nationalist pressure from the CHP base.
Unlike DEVA, IYIP views Syrian Kurdish insurgent groups to be directly linked with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), opposes any diplomatic talks with Kurdish groups in Syria, and even criticised Erdogan for not being tougher with Finland and Sweden for allegedly supporting the PKK.
The chief architect of the AKP's interventionist foreign policy after the Arab Up­ris­ings, former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davu­toglu, is currently in the opposition camp as leader of the GP. Although the likelihood of Davutoglu returning to his old post is low, his presence in the oppo­sition camp may complicate efforts of the new government to break from the AKP's failed policies that are directly associated with him.
In a country that hosts more than six mil­lion refugees and irregular migrants, the status of this growing community would be another major challenge for the new gov­ern­ment. Due to civil wars in the region, Turkey has recently emerged as the top host country for refugees in the world, with approximately four million from Syria alone.
CHP leader Kilicdaroglu has consistently criticised the open-door policy for Syrians and opposed Turkey's military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. He recently became more vocal with these criticisms, pledging to send Syrians back to their country vol­untarily in two years through increased dia­logue with the Assad regime and financial assistance from the EU for infrastructure development in Syria.
IYIP advocates a simi­lar agenda that includes the expulsion of illegal immigrants and a quota system for the settlement of Syrians in urban neighbour­hoods.
Founded in 2021 by Umit Ozdag, who was a far-right deputy from the MHP and, briefly, from IYIP, the ZP quickly increased its popularity as a single-issue party focussed on expelling refugees back to their country.
Despite not being part of a formal alliance, it has gen­erated strong interest on social media and currently polls around 1 to 4 per cent.
While openly admitting that the open-door policy is unsustainable, the two splin­ter parties – DEVA and the GP – have until recently not publicly advocated for the return of Syrian refugees.
As the chief architect of the 2016 EU-Turkey migration deal, for instance, Davutoglu's GP is calling for a return to the agreement's framework and wants to limit the settlement of Syrian refugees to designated areas. Meanwhile, DEVA leader Babacan openly questioned the feasibility and legality of returning Syrians back to their country earlier this year.
In response to growing anti-refugee sen­timent, however, both parties have changed their positions on this issue and joined other opposition parties by declaring their commitment for the return of Syrians, albeit voluntarily.
Unless it is backed up by a strong political commitment and a diplomatic agreement with Syria, however, voluntary return is destined to remain at low levels. After living in Turkey for a decade, few Syrians want to return to Syria willingly. It is unlikely that the Assad gov­ern­ment would welcome these refugees, many of whom are treated as opponents of the regime due to their Sunni Muslim faith.
Dr Berk Esen was IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP.
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