Anthony Avice Du Buisson who writes on politics, foreign policy and the Middle East also told Kurdpress in an interview that Ankara and Washington are at odds over the situation in the Kurdish-controlled north of Syria and it seems very unlikely for the Turkey and the U.S. to settle their differences over the Syrian Kurds issue as the U.S. is continuing its cooperation with the Kurds.

The U.S. is seeking to achieve its goals in Syria and the goal is solely achieved through cooperation with the Kurds in the north and Russia, on the other hand, is trying to use the situation to weaken the NATO.

What follows is Du Buisson’s full answers to Kurdpress questions;

Can Kurds in Syria reach an agreement with Bashar al-Assad?

There is a possibility that an agreement between the Syrian Kurds and Bashar al-Assad can be reached, however, it is unlikely to materialise with the government in Damascus' current mentality and unwillingness to budge on issues important to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES), such as political autonomy, pluralism and civil rights.

For over fifty years, the Syrian Arab Republic has been ruled by the Syrian Ba'ath party with the Assad family being the main beneficiaries of power. Throughout those many decades of authoritarian rule, minority populaces in Syria such as the Kurds endured targeted policies of exclusion; forced displacement, detentions, torture and violence. The government in Damascus in pursuit of the ruling Syrian Ba'ath party's ideology sought to deny the autonomy, identity and independence of its minority populaces in order to create a homogenized Arab state. These 'Arab supremacist' policies, first enforced under Hafez al-Assad and then Bashar al-Assad, continued right into the 21st century.

When the Syrian war broke out in 2011, the Kurds of Syria like the rest of the Sunni populace throughout the country took to the streets and demanded political autonomy, civil rights, etc. Joining with other minorities in the north of Syria, Kurds formed militias and eventually pushed out the Syrian military from the north of the country, except for places in Qamishli and Hasakah. Creating a multi-ethnic defacto autonomous government in the wake of the war, the ruling political coalition of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV DEM) headed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) pursued policies that sought to dismantle the Arab supremacist ideology of the Syrian Ba'ath party. This is one aspect of TEV DEM's larger project for the northeast, which is to pursue the construction of a multi-ethnic, pluralistic and democratic political project from the ideology of Democratic Confederalism. This of course is still adopted to this day in the NES. I mention this history, because it is important to know for understanding the attitude and rationale adopted by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) officials in negotiations with government officials in Damascus.

As for the rationale and attitude adopted by officials of the Damascus government, that is a bit 'different'. Since the start of the war, Bashar al-Assad has been clear on his intentions to regain control over all of Syria, including the northeast. Throughout the course of the war, the Syrian Arab army with the support of Russian Jets and assistance of Iranian paramilitaries has used whatever means, including the use of chemical weapons, to ensure that cities fall under the control of Damascus. The government has and continues to use extreme military force in its military campaigns with disregard for the civilian population. Offering opposition entities deals of survival in exchange to come back into the fold. Those that refuse such deals are left to face the wrath of a government that has shown in the past its determination to regain control over the country.

Regardless of the mentality adopted by Assad, SDC officials such as Ilhan Ehmed are continuing to negotiate for a political settlement with Syrian state officials. The aim of negotiations are to ensure the longevity of TEV DEM's political project and the progress of gains made against the Islamic State in the northeast. These negotiations are frustratingly slow at the moment with the government unwilling to budge on issues of importance. For the NES, political autonomy and civil rights are most important. In exchange for these demands, the NES has offered that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) be integrated into the Syrian military amongst other concessions, such as the giving of some territories currently under the NES to the regime. However, the government in Damascus continues to show a lack of interest in such negotiations and continues to call for the expulsion of 'unwelcome foreign powers' (notably, Turkey and the United States) from the country. Officials of TEV DEM, such as former co-head Salih Muslim, have also said that a return to prewar day Assad control is unacceptable and that the regime in Damascus must respect previously oppressed minorities.

When considering the aforementioned reasons in addition to the disapproval from the United States towards negotiations, I do not believe that a political settlement will materialize. Although there is a possibility that such an agreement can arise between the Syrian Kurds and Bashar al-Assad, the probability of one arising is unlikely given the diametrically opposed ideologies.

It seems that the U.S. and Turkey have not reached an agreement regarding Kurds and Northern Syria. Is this true? Can we see a safe zone by U.S. to protect the Kurds in the northeast?

This is true. The United States government and the Turkish government are still at odds as to the future of Syria. Both governments continue to disagree on how to resolve the current problem between each. Ankara wants the United States to cut ties with the YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK in Syria. Ankara also wants to establish a security zone in northern Syria along Turkey's southern border in order to clear out "terrorists". Washington does not wish to abandon its local Syrian partner force (YPG/SDF) because of the contribution that force has made to the war against ISIS. Washington has also warned Ankara that such an intervention into the north of Syria would create devastating consequences.

US Central Command in the Middle East (CENTCOM) is currently conducting counterterrorism operations with the SDF and local Asayish to clear out remaining ISIS sleeper cells. The Coalition is also investing in the post-ISIS restablisation phase of the region, which involves creating an environment to prevent the rise of another ISIS type group. However, CENTCOM has had to deal frustratingly with a White House that is erratic with an unformed Syria policy. Trump announced the withdrawal of forces in mid-December and since then, the region's leaders are uncertain as to the next steps of the SDF and post-ISIS phase.

To the question of whether the US will pursue the creation of a Safe Zone in Syria that is more difficult to answer. Although the US has shown in the past through operation Provide Comfort and Northern Watch in the post-Gulf war phase its ability to create a safe zone for the Kurds of Iraq, the war against ISIS poses its own unique challenges. CENTCOM defacto has a no fly zone already in place over northern Syria for anti-ISIS operations but how long that zone will be maintained is entirely dependent on the White House. The Trump administration can continue to - for domestic purposes - tell the electorate that it will withdraw troops from Syria, well maintaining a small special forces contingent force in the area. That will prove useful if the US maintains its current troop numbers. However, should the Trump admin pursue a complete withdrawal, then there will be problems. The current US contingent is providing assistance to the SDF and maintaining a purely security and counter-terrorism purpose. A reduction or complete withdrawal is likely to undermine US foreign policy regarding Syria and the post-ISIS stabilisation mission.

I personally believe the Trump Admin will not withdraw a large number of troops in Syria and wil instead maintain a contingent force for the next five years. This is good because maintaining a small contingent force also allows for the air force to maintain their presence over the area, thus maintaining a defacto No Fly Zone. The only issue will be Turkey. If Erdogan continues to demand and prepare an intervention into the northeast, then that will be a massive problem for the Coalition's mission. However, with Erdogan's rhetoric declining as of late, there is a possibility that Erdogan will not carry out his promise to invade the northeast. That is only if pressure continues to mount against his presidency internally in Turkey or externally from the US.

How do you assess the United States and Russian policy towards the Kurds?

The United States government's modern policy towards the Kurds originates really in the post-Cold War era with the close of the first Persian Gulf war. After Bush Senior called for uprisings across Iraq in early 1990s, Kurds took up arms against Saddam which resulted in retaliation by Saddam's army. In response to this retaliation, the Bush Senior administration approved of operation Provide Comfort (1 and 2) to provide assistance to the Kurds of Iraq, which helped the Kurds establish control over the north of Iraq (Bashur). When the United States went to war with Saddam in the second Persian Gulf War, the United States through operation Northern Watch and later Iraqi freedom assisted the peshmerga to fight Saddam's army. Since then, the United States has supported the Kurdish Regional Government both militarily and politically in the frame work of a 'united Iraq'. However, It is important to know that the US' initial support for the Kurds in Iraq was as a means to an end - that being the end of Saddam and development of a post-Saddam Iraq for the interests of National Security

Similarly, the United States' policy towards the Kurds of Syria developed during the siege of Kobani by ISIS. The US was assisting a number of groups in Syria prior to that time for the purpose of forcing the Assad regime into a political settlement. When ISIS was rising across Iraq and Syria in 2014, the United States' saw an opportunity in the groups defending Kobani (YPG/FSA, etc.) This opportunity developed into Operation inherent resolve - an anti-ISIS policy led by CENTCOM and the Pentagon's arms program. This policy differs slightly to that early policy CENTCOM had in Iraq, where instead of using a large contingent of forces to combat an enemy force, there was this philosophy of working 'by and through' local partners. In this case, it was working with the YPG and later forming the SDF to combat ISIS with minimum troops. And just like the Kurds of Iraq taking advantage of the support the US provided, the YPG/SDF has taken advantage of the support the US has provided to develop their own political project greatly.

The US is working with the SDF to combat ISIS and establish an environment for the stabilisation of the region. This is the short term policy that the US is currently pursuing and so far the policy is working but it is not yet fully developed in the form of a long term policy. As Trump officials and State Department officials continue to say, the current policy is directed against combating ISIS. And well there are suggestions that the policy is developed in line with the UN peace process for the greater Syrian conflict, the US has yet to demonstrate a sincerity with this policy, which leads me to believe the current erratic nature of the White House is creating problems for foreign policy development regarding Syria, especially long term policy. Should the US continue with this approach it is likely to increasingly push itself into a corner with other more sincere actors in the region, such as Russia playing more important roles for the future of Syria.

Russia's policy towards the Kurds in Syria started during Russia's intervention into the conflict in 2015. Reaching out to establish bilateral relations with TEVDEM, the Russian government pursued a direct role in the conflict and acted as the political Guarantor for the Assad regime in negotiations over Syria. TEVDEM was allowed to open up an office in Moscow and negotiate with Russian officials for a political role in Syria's future, which Russia - with the purpose of undermining the US - is happy to accommodate. However, Russia has shown in the last two years its more realist side by attempting to manipulate the NES into giving up territory to Assad. An example of this was during late 2017 and early 2018 with Afrin, where the Russian government attempted to force the Afrin Council into handing over Afrin to the Assad regime in exchange for security from a Turkish invasion. When the Afrin Council refused, the Russian government worked with Turkey to approve of an intervention into Afrin.

This strategy of the 'carrot and the stick' is how Russia operates in Syria now regarding the Kurds and other polities in Syria. It is more than willing to offer TEVDEM an opportunity to hold some power in Syria, but only in exchange for submitting to the Assad regime, which is a problem that has already been touched upon above in my first answer. Russian forces still patrol around the Shahba region in the northwest of Aleppo, but it is likely Russia will give this area to Turkey in the oncoming months, since relations are developing more closely between Ankara and Moscow. Russia's purpose with this manipulative game is to hurt the NATO alliance and the US. A policy that shows the rather deceptive nature of the Russian government.

How do you describe the Kurdish question in Turkey?

This question is quite complex and requires a lengthy discussion about the history of the Kurds in Turkey. Since I do not wish to write a long book on this topic, I will attempt to summarise in short form this history and highlight how this history impacts on the attitude of Kurds in modern Turkey.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, the modern Turkish State led under Mustafa Kamal Attaturk fought wars to retain what was left of the fractured empire. Fighting the Greeks amongst other former minorities of the empire to retain power and establish political hegemony over these groups. One of these groups were the Kurds. For decades after the initial fracturing of the empire, the Kemalist ideology of Attaturk created a fanaticism in the government to forge a homogeneous and monolithic Turkish identity through the subjugation of minority groups. Kurds were subjected to Turkification policies designed to deny them their identity and culture. When Attaturk died, this Kemalist ideology empowered through the military and authoritarianism of the nation continued to increase, leading civil rights groups and militias to emerge in the countries.

The majority of these civil rights groups consisted of the youth and fought for political autonomy. Although far-left leaning, these groups fought against the Turkish Security Forces from the 1960s onwards. One of the groups that emerged out of this period of revolutionary zeal was the the predominantly Kurdish 'Kurdistan Workers Party' (PKK), led by Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan represented one of the many growing voices of Kurdish youth who demanded a recognition of their identity. The Turkish state denied Kurds access to learning their language, their culture and identity. Instead referring to them as 'Mountain Kurds' and forcing an assimilation policy onto them that violated their human rights. This would lead to riots and protest, which gave way to authoritarian policies brought on by a coup in 1980.

The Military government established in this coup cracked down harshly on these civil rights groups, forcing organisations like the PKK to flee to Lebanon and Syria. The PKK started training in Lebanon and Syria forming a military force (HPG) to fight against the Turkish government. This of course started the more than three decade long PKK-Turkish government conflict. The war was one started for the purpose of achieving greater political rights for Kurds in Turkey. Fast forward to the 1990s, the war continued to result in civilian death and sparked mainstream discussion in Turkey over the 'Kurdish Question', which is really a conversation over whether the Kurds should be allowed to achieve statehood and civil rights.

In the late 1990s, the Syrian government expelled Ocalan and the PKK from Syria due to the Turkish government's threat to invade Syria if the government did not expel the PKK. International cooperation between the US, Turkey and Israel would eventually result in Ocalan's capture and detention in 1998. This came after nearly two decades of fighting where the Turkish government killed thousands of Kurds under the guise of combating terrorism. Ever since Ocalan's arrest, the PKK has reformed their Marxist-Leninist ideology to a more social libertarian ideology of Democratic Confederalism. The Turkish government since then has given minor reform for Kurds, but not proper civil rights.

Though the above summary of history is simplistic, the summary does give context for what I am going to say now:

The Kurdish question in Turkey has yet to be effectively addressed by the Turkish state in the last three decades. Well there has been minor reforms that granted Kurds a small number of rights, there continues to prevail an inherent and systemic ideology of anti-Kurdishness held by the Turkish state. The Turkish state fundamentally fears an independent Kurdish nation and under the guise of terrorism it continues to do what it cans to oppose Kurdish statehood. For the Turkish state, an independent Kurdish polity in the Middle East will encourage the millions of Kurds living in the southeast to seek a Kurdish polity in Turkey. Because of this reason, the Turkish government continues to deny public acknowledgements of Kurdish identity in Parliament, continues to crack down on Kurdish dissent in Bakur and continues to utilise its intelligence and military to carry out operation against Kurdish groups. The Kurdish regional Government is the only polity that Turkey has relations with, but these relations do not extend to support of Kurdish independence as was evident with Turkey's opposition to Kurdish independence in Bashur.

As long as the Turkish state continues to adopt an ideology of anti-Kurdishness, there will not be peace between the Turkish government and Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The longer it continues to refuse to address the Kurdish question, the state will continue to be in a perpetual and never ending war with its own population. The only solution to the current crises between the Kurds and the Turkish is state is for reconciliation and active engagement in negotiations for civil rights. Hopefully then an answer will arise to the Kurdish question.

Reporter’s code: 40101