The professor added that opposing Kurds is the main element of Turkey’s policy .

What follows is his full answers to Kurdpress questions;

How do you see the end game in Syria? Can Kurds make a semi-state region for themselves with or without Afrin?

The reality on the ground is that the PYD is control of not only largely Kurdish regions, but also districts and regions that are predominantly Arab. From the distance of the United States, it is impossible to tell how deep support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is dependent on the PYD, goes amongst the Arabs. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Kurdish led forces constitute the ‘state’ for a large part of north eastern Syria. Moreover, it seems that, at least in Kurdish populated regions, this ‘state’ enjoys a significant degree of popular support. It should be remember that it came into existence organically as a result of the disintegration of the Assad regime in 2011. Kurdish forces were certainly strengthened by the military support that they received after 2014 from the United States, within the context of the fight against ISIS. Indeed, without American support, an assault on Raqqa would have been inconceivable. Nevertheless, Rojava was not a ‘creation’ of western imperialism. It was the product specific local conditions.

This means that either the Syrian central government will come to some type of de facto or de jure arrangement with the Kurds (one that is accepted by neighbors such as Turkey) or, at some point, considerable military force will be needed to ‘put the Kurdish question back in the box’.

Turkey is clearly willing to use such violence. However, they are limited. They can only attack Afrin because it is disconnected from the rest of Rojava and because it lies in the Russian zone of influence. It is almost inconceivable – despite Erdogan’s bombastic language – that Turkey would launch a strike of other parts of Rojava, regions and districts in which the United States is operating. Moreover, the strength of the resistance in Afrin to the Turkish assault demonstrates that even if the United States withdraws any further expansion of the war could be extremely costly. So, in short, I cannot predicate any ‘end game’ in Syria, it certainly seems reasonable to assume that, even if Afrin does fall, the Syrian Kurds will continue to enjoy a form of ‘statehood’ for the foreseeable future, especially if America forces remain in the region.

What U.S wants form Kurds and then from Syria? Is Rojava the place that U.S wants to make a restroom for itself regarding its affairs whit Iraq, Syria and Turkey? We know that relation with Turkey is not good, Iran has a huge influence on Iraq and Syria do not want U.S be there.

I don’t know that even the Americans know what they want from the Kurds or Syria. It is certainly true that early during the Syrian Civil War, the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia favored ‘regime change’ in Damascus. However, Iran and Russia’s more active intervention on the side of the Assad Regime seems to have made regime change nearly impossible. For the United States there is the issue of ISIS of course. However, I don’t think there is a clear idea of a long-term plan for what to do in Syria after ISIS is completely cleared.

How do you see Russian relations with Kurds (of Turkey, Iraq and Syria)?

Like most major powers, including the United States and the nations of Europe, Russia has a Turkey policy and a Syria policy and an Iraq policy and an Iran policy. Russia does not have a Kurdish policy. Their stance vis-à-vis the Kurds is entirely a function of their relationship with these countries. In an even more overt and cynical way than the United States, Russia sees the Kurds as a useful ‘tool’ in managing relations with the regional powers that rule over the Middle East’s Kurdish population.

Do you believe that solving Kurdish problem in Turkey can solve the Turkish problems with Syrian Kurds?

Yes. The current military assault on Afrin is supported not only by the AKP, but the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The CHP – which styles itself the party of Ataturk – represents the old ‘secular nationalist’ elite and ideology that ran Turkey for much of its modern history. While the CHP and its supporters are deeply hostile to the Islamic orientation of the AKP, it is equally (and if not more) anti-Kurdish. CHP members of parliament voted to allow the government to arrest and place on trial the leaders of the HDP. They also support the invasion of Afrin. Therefore, it is fair to state that anti-Kurdism is a central feature of mainstream Turkish politics. Turkey’s fears of the Syrian Kurds are related to their own internal issues. If the Kurdish question is resolved peacefully in Turkey, then Turkey will be able to engage constructively with the Kurdish populations beyond its borders.

Can KRG and Baghdad reach an agreement regarding recent talks between missions in Baghdad?

I don’t have enough information to answer this.

Regarding recent coalition between Berhem Salih and Gorran an Islamic group, do you believe that this changes the balance of power in Kurdistan or, better to say that PUK and KDP will not be in power no longer?

Well, no one knows. However, I would note this. Despite the existence of a parliament (which is shut down when the KDP is unhappy with it) and other superficial trappings of a democracy, change in the KRG is very difficult. KDP and PUK are not simply ‘normal’ political parties that compete for office. They control the economy, military, and the media. The fundamental systems of economic patronage that sustain the system still exist. I don’t know how much can change will this system still exists.

The next elections are going be a test. If KDP and PUK loose power in free elections, will they give up power? If not, what happens next?

Do you believe that Baghdad can control KRI completely so that Kurdistan no longer be an autonomous Region?

I doubt they are willing or able. The objective of the Kirkuk operation was to humiliate the KRG and control the oil. They have achieved that.

Can Kurds one day use the outcome of referendum as a reliable document for their independence?

I am not sure what you mean by reliable. It certainly shows that the Iraqi Kurds want an independent state. But most people know that. It will only have meaning, if the international community gives it meaning.

We do not see a serious western engagement regarding Kurdistan Region’s crises, why?

It is because they approach international relations from the perspective of the nation-state. The Kurds do not have a nation-state. Therefore, Kurdish ‘policy’ is always related to the policy towards the countries in which the Kurds live.