The government of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been just formed and it is the first government after the independence referendum of the region in September 2017 which was refused by Iraq and the regional states and was not supported by the world powers.

To shed light on the latest developments in Iraq and the Kurdish autonomous region Kurdpress did an interview with Joel Wing, a political observer in Iraq. What follows is his full answers to Kurdpress questions.

The previous complex for Kurdistan presidency now belongs to Masoud Barzani, former President of Kurdistan Region and this place is called Bargay Barzani which means a special status is given to Barzani beyond its current position as KDP leader. Do you think this is a parallel power to Kurdistan presidency? Can it limit Nechirvan Barzani's power as the new President of Kurdistan Region?

The elder Barzani remains the real power behind not only the KDP but the KRG. While President Nechivan Barzani can carry out his day to day affairs no big decisions are made without consulting with Masoud.

How you access Erbil- Baghdad ties as the Kurdistan region will be led by Nechirvan and Masrour Barzani?

PM Mahdi is a longtime friend of the Kurds since the opposition politics of the 1990s. Shiite parliamentarians are complaining that he is not enforcing the 2019 budget that requires the KRG to export a set amount of oil each month in return for receiving its share of the budget each month. Mahdi has tried to ignore this criticism, but that might change if the summer gets hot with protests in southern Iraq and Mahdi’s position deteriorates. Otherwise the status quo will be maintained between the central and regional governments.

Two big problems between Erbil- Baghdad are the disputed areas and oil and gas, do you see any progress in this regards in coming years?

The disputed territories have already been decided after the 2017 independence referendum. PM Abadi seized all the areas that the Peshmerga had taken over in 2014 during the war and more such as Kirkuk city. There is no reason for Baghdad to give any of these areas back, and Kurdistan has no leverage either.

As for oil and gas, the central government has a series of lawsuits against the Kurds’ independent oil exports but these are likely to be stuck in court for the foreseeable future. That means the current situation is not going to change. I would assume that even if the courts rule against the KRG it will not comply and continue with its oil and gas policy.

The only real change that might happen is if PM Mahdi decides to cut payments to the KRG. The region is financially insolvent and owes huge debts to oil traders. Without the money from Baghdad it would probably have to return to austerity and not paying its government workers. If Mahdi took this action the goal would not be any kind of real change but rather to get the KRG to export its quota of oil set by the 2019 budget.

It is said that there is an internal problem in the KDP party but Masoud Barzani does not let it become public, how do you see this?

There is talk that there are splits between members of the family that support the status quo and those that want reform. Nechirvan is said to be more open to changes while his cousin Masrour want to keep things the way they are. Unlike the PUK, these differences have not come out. Publicly the KDP speaks with one voice. That’s especially important now as it is attempting to end the power sharing deal with the PUK and become the dominant part in the region.

Disputes between KDP and PUK prevented establishing a new government in Kurdistan region, Can the two reach an agreement?

The two sides will eventually have to. The KDP is in the dominant position and is using that to claim all the top spots in the new government like premier and president. It no longer feels the need to maintain the roughly 50-50 split for offices with the PUK. This has caused great resentment within the Patriotic Union that is facing internal divisions and challenges from newer parties in Sulaymaniya. Eventually the KDP and PUK will come to a compromise because the latter can’t survive without a role in the government. That would cost it standing and more importantly power, money and patronage to dole out to its followers.

Turkey has an extended presence in the Kurdistan region due to its operation against PKK, but KRG, PDK, and other Parties are silent, why?

Turkey has had military bases and soldiers in Kurdistan since the 1990s. The KDP has forged a close relationship with Turkey in recent times. Turkey is a major investor in the KRG, and gives the Barzanis political support as well. They have no reason to bite the hand that feeds them. Not only that but the KDP does not have a good relationship with the PKK. All together that means when Turkey carries out an operation or bombs the border area where the PKK is located the KDP and KRG talk about how Baghdad has to do something about it rather than the regional government.

KRG says it tries to rebuild Peshmerga forces and make it a professional force so that it is no longer a force loyal to political parties like KDP and PUK, is it possible?

The Peshmerga are receiving extensive training from Coalition members to try to make it more professional with the ultimate goal of placing them under the control of the Peshmerga Ministry and government. For some units that’s already true, but for the main ones, they will always remain party militias. They not only act as a guarantee on the position of the KDP and PUK, but they also act as a patronage and job network to keep people loyal. That dynamic is not going to change any time soon.

Reporter’s code: 40101