Originally scheduled for 2022, the upcoming Oct. 20 polls have faced multiple obstacles—largely stemming from disputes between the two dominant Kurdish parties: the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Sulaimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Ahead of the vote, political factions face a radically altered electoral landscape. Possibly the most dramatic change to the Kurdistan region’s legislature came in February this year, when Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court moved to scrap the 11 minority quota seats in the assembly. 
The KDP has long been accused of dominating the quota seats, given that minority lawmakers consistently vote in line with the party on major decisions. As such, the move to abolish the allocations initially compelled the KDP—and several parties affiliated with minorities—to threaten an electoral boycott, only reversing course after Iraq’s top judicial authority reserved five seats for minorities.
Another critical change is that the ballot will now be overseen by a federal body, the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). This new dynamic has raised high hopes among opposition parties’ ranks that they can look forward to a more fair fight.
Within this new electoral landscape, popular discontent with the Kurdish political establishment has put the ruling duopoly in a bind. The KDP and PUK’s leaderships understand that loosening their stranglehold over the semi-autonomous region’s levers of power may relieve growing frustration with their rule. However, doing so may also help move opposition parties to the fore, and potentially upend the rules of political engagement that Erbil and Sulaimaniyah have so carefully cultivated in their favor.

Is the KDP on the back foot?
The KDP is by most accounts apprehensive about the upcoming elections. The party has largely been on the defensive since it in 2021 failed to form a “national majority” government with Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shiite Arab leader of the Sadrist Movement, and prominent Sunni Arab politician—and former parliament speaker—Mohammed Al-Halbousi. 
The move was ultimately blocked by the Iran-allied parties in the Shiite Coordination Framework, which are now in power. Since then, the KDP has found itself at odds with Tehran's interests, precisely as the PUK has further cultivated already close ties with Iran. After Sadr's withdrawal from politics in Aug. 2022, and with Halbousi in Nov. 2023 losing his position as parliament speaker, the KDP has increasingly found itself short of allies in Baghdad. 
As a result, the KDP’s leadership worries that its dominance over the Kurdistan region could be jeopardized, potentially through accords between Iran-allied factions in Baghdad and the PUK. Hoping to bolster its position, the KDP in May this year dispatched top party official and Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani to Tehran aiming for reconciliation ahead of the Oct. 20 elections. Of further note, Barzani and other top KDP figures also hosted new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Sept. 12.

KDP in the PUK’s sights
KDP political strategists are unlikely to forget the loss of just under 110,000 votes in Iraq’s 2021 national parliamentary elections compared to the 2018 Kurdistan Parliament polls—nor the loss of two seats in its stronghold of Duhok. While the Barzani-led party initially hailed its 45-seat result in the 2021 elections as a success, political observers suggest that widespread voter apathy allowed it to maintain its dominance. 
The KDP is also grappling with an increasingly hostile and emboldened PUK under the leadership of Bafel Talabani. The Sulaimaniyah-based party has in recent years exploited ongoing and fractious budget disputes between Baghdad and Erbil over delayed public sector salaries, aiming to pin the crisis on the KDP and take its rival down a peg. 
In contrast with the KDP’s hand-wringing, the PUK seems to be approaching the upcoming Kurdistan Parliament elections with a cautious optimism. Since asserting sole leadership of the PUK in 2022, Talabani has centralized and honed its party discipline, bolstering the confidence of its supporters and cadres.
The party’s fortunes have also been given a shot in the arm after Iraq’s Dec. 2023 provincial elections, with the PUK garnering five seats to the KDP’s two in Kirkuk Governorate. Adding to the PUK's victory, Talabani successfully orchestrated the appointment of a PUK member as the Kirkuk governor after eight months of a closely contested struggle among the parties of the multi-ethnic governorate. This move will further bolster the party's confidence ahead of the upcoming elections.

Opposition parties smell blood in the water
Despite the apparent threat posed by the PUK, the KDP may find solace in that emerging opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan are more likely to challenge its rivals in Sulaimaniyah rather than undermine its own position. One major challenge comes from the Popular Front, led by the PUK’s former co-president—and cousin of Bafel Talabani—Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabany. While the latter was popular among the PUK’s grassroots, he was ousted following a 2021 power struggle. 
Sheikh Jangi's decision to contest the upcoming elections suggests that he is aiming to reclaim the political influence lost when he was pushed out of the PUK. Since the Popular Front’s formal establishment in Jan. 2024, the party has come out swinging, including by establishing a media outfit to amplify its message. These moves follow the ex-PUK leader’s unsuccessful attempts to form a joint electoral list with popular former Gorran Movement MP Ali Hama Salih, leading the latter to create his own party, the National Stance Movement. 
While Salih’s new faction has limited financial resources and media backing, it boasts several popular anti-establishment hopefuls, including political activist Badal Barwari and journalist Sherwan Sherwani. The latter planned to contest his seat from an Erbil prison after authorities issued a 2021 sentence his supporters allege was politically motivated, but ultimately saw his candidacy rejected by IHEC.
However, any potential successes for the National Stance Movement will likely be at the expense of Salih’s former colleagues. Gorran—which split from the PUK in 2009—is expected to see yet another significant decline in votes after heavy losses in the 2021 federal parliamentary elections.

Kurdistan’s electoral groundhog day
The prevailing dynamics suggest that opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan stand more to gain—and lose—from each other than they do vis-à-vis the two dominant Kurdish parties. Political analyst Yassin Taha told Amwaj.media, "In the next parliament, the current KDP and PUK are projected to secure two-thirds…[of seats], leaving only a small portion for the opposition." Taha added that "opposition parties are unable to disrupt the status quo because they hold no power over the Kurdistan region’s security and military establishments." 
Nor should opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan put too much faith in IHEC’s ability to assure a level playing field. The director of the Kurdish Institute for Elections, Aram Jamal, told Amwaj.media that despite the two dominant parties "having limited authority over the IHEC, this does not necessarily mean that the Iraqi commission is flawless." 
Furthermore, a growing sense that the electoral game benefits the ruling parties has undermined faith in the Kurdistan region’s democratic process, a dynamic that will likely worsen if the upcoming polls reassert the status quo. With the results seen by many in Iraqi Kurdistan as a foregone conclusion, it is no surprise that voters have increasingly stayed away from the ballot box; only 35.7% of the semi-autonomous region’s eligible voters turned out for the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
However, Jamal is optimistic about the prospects of the Kurdistan Parliament elections, suggesting that voters are emboldened by the new parties’ chances of upending political dynamics. After all, Jamal of the Kurdish Institute for Elections remarked, "If elections are not important, why did the KDP hesitate to participate?"
By Renwar Najm
Amwaj