Under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK engaged in a terrorist campaign to carve out a Kurdish state from Turkish territory, resulting in a bloody war that caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths.

Ocalan was captured by Turkish special forces in April 1999, prosecuted, and imprisoned. From jail, he continued to influence the activities of the PKK and the wider Kurdish political movement inside Turkey. Since Ocalan’s incarceration, the PKK has oscillated between implementing violent and non-violent approaches to pursuing its aims for Kurdish rights inside Turkey, while a non-militant political Kurdish movement flourished inside the Turkish parliament. The Kurdish parliamentary movement distanced itself from the PKK’s secessionist goals, seeking instead to gain democratic rights for Kurds inside Turkey, which Ocalan broadly came to support over time.

The PKK is a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. It was listed as a terrorist entity by the West after waging a bloody secessionist campaign against the Turkish state, resulting in the death of not only Turkish military and state officials but also civilians. Since the beginning of the conflict, it is estimated that 50,000 people have died.

In fighting the PKK, the Turkish state has employed a dual track over the years. On one hand, the military has spent vast resources directly combating the PKK. On the other hand, the state has inflicted collective punishment against Turkey’s Kurds by denying their very existence, limiting the practice of their cultural rights, burning Kurdish settlements, and suppressing the Kurdish democratic parliamentary movement.

Since 2012, there have been several failed attempts to secure a lasting peace between the Turkish government and the PKK. Since late 2024, however, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has engaged in direct negotiations with Ocalan, resulting in Ocalan calling on the PKK in February 2025 to lay down its weapons and disband. The May 12 announcement now comes from the PKK organization itself following its 12th Congress. It states that the organization has achieved its “historical mission” and has “decided to dissolve the structure of the PKK to end the armed struggle method.”

The obvious question is why now? After 48 years of waging a secessionist campaign, why is the PKK broadcasting its intent to end its secessionist campaign?

As things stand, no details relating to the PKK’s announcement and reasoning have been disclosed. Will the PKK lay down its weapons and disband? Will Ocalan be released from prison? What will happen to the leadership of the organization as well as its rank-and-file members? How will Erdogan be able to sell this deal to the Turkish people, who overwhelmingly have negative views of the PKK? More importantly, what will Erdogan get from reaching an agreement with the PKK? Speculation is rife among Turkish analysts that the Kurdish parliamentary movement will help Erdogan secure a fourth term as president by voting through the necessary constitutional changes. In return, Erdogan will grant Kurds broad cultural freedoms that may be guaranteed under the law.

It is clear that whatever understanding has been reached between Erdogan, the PKK, and the Kurdish parliamentary movement has been accomplished behind closed doors. This was not the case between 2012 and 2015, when the first two rounds of the Kurdish peace process had some semblance of being carried out in the open with societal input. These initiatives both failed.

If lasting peace is reached between the Turkish government and the PKK, it could have significant regional repercussions. Most importantly, this development could end years of bloodshed and instability inside Turkey—an outcome that surely can and must be supported.

A deal with the PKK could also help defuse tensions between the United States and Turkey. Since 2014, Washington has supported the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as its partner of choice to fight the Islamic State. Ankara has consistently accused Washington of working with terrorists inside Syria, and its military targeted SDF forces, endangering US troops working alongside them. In the event of a negotiated settlement, Turkey’s animus towards the SDF could dissipate. However, it appears that Erdogan wants the disarmament of the PKK to also apply to the SDF, and it’s unclear if the deal extends and applies to the Syrian group.  

On the other hand, we must be cautious in our interpretation of developments. There is little doubt that if a negotiated deal between the PKK and the Turkish government succeeds, Erdogan will claim it as a win for democracy, and that he brought an end to PKK terrorism in Turkey. The opaque and non-participatory negotiations between the two sides have taken place at a time when Erdogan has all but mothballed any semblance of democratic governance in Turkey.

On March 19, government prosecutors loyal to Erdogan arbitrarily arrested and jailed the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu. His imprisonment confirmed suspicions that Erdogan is willing to prevent any credible person from challenging him to the presidency in a democratic election. Thus, this deal will not help secure a dawn of democracy in Turkey, but likely the dawn of Erdogan’s perpetual presidency—for how can a country reach a democratic outcome when there is no rule of law?

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University, and an expert on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.

By Sinan Ciddi

Long War Journal