Iraq emerged deeply divided, with its population distribution across different regions (including Baghdad) mainly following sectarian and ethnic lines. The country's constitution recognizes this heterogeneity and establishes federalism as a founding principle. Key positions (president of the republic, prime minister and parliament speaker) are distributed among the main communities (respectively, Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni), and appointments to these positions often result in a consensus among foreign powers, particularly the U.S. and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Crescendo of mistrust

Syria risks undergoing a similar process. Indeed, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian Army was heavily bombarded by the Israeli air force, and its facilities, barracks and equipment were largely destroyed, effectively paralyzing it. The former army command, which was largely based on the Alawite community and loyalists of the former regime, was also neutralized by the collapse of the Assad regime. The new power must therefore rely mainly on the armed factions it controlled to govern the country rather than the regular army.

Furthermore, Syria is fragmented into ethnic and religious entities (Sunni, Alawite, Druze and Kurdish) that harbor a strong mistrust, which the Assad era, by instrumentalizing them, has only exacerbated. Incidents since early 2025 between the central government of the new interim president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and the Alawite and Druze communities have brought this mistrust to a peak. Finally, the country is torn between several contradictory external influences, particularly those of Turkey and Israel, engaged in a covert struggle (not to mention Iran, which could attempt to return to the Syrian scene). Israel, which openly supports the Druze and maintains relationships with the Kurds, seeks at all costs to obstruct Turkey's advancement (which is allied with Sharaa) on Syrian soil and does not hesitate to bomb the positions of factions allied with Ankara.

While Syrian minorities, Druze and Kurdish (and even Alawite), seem to want to keep the current power in Damascus in check, the unity of the Syrian regime itself is not guaranteed, as it is composed of numerous rival factions that do not always strictly follow Sharaa's directives.

Cautious Lebanon

Is there a risk of power splitting between northern factions, allied with Turkey, and southern ones, often close to Gulf countries (or even behind them, Israel)? Could Syria revert to its map during the French mandate, which divided the country into Alawite, Druze and Kurdish entities, while creating two Sunni-majority provinces of Damascus and Aleppo? The question is all the more pertinent given that, according to the provisional Constitutional Declaration of March 2025, Syria remains a unitary state, not a federal one. Meanwhile, Sharaa declared in February 2025 that implementing a constitution and holding elections could take three to five years. Will Syria use this time to bring its rival political and communal forces closer together, or will it move toward an Iraq-style federalization?

Lebanon is observing these developments with caution, even apprehension. On one hand, it hosts nearly two million Syrian displaced persons, whose presence and stay are closely tied to their homeland's future. On the other hand, any destabilization in Syria could have consequences for Lebanon, especially if it pits the Syrian government against its minorities, who are also represented in Lebanon. In case of conflict, the risk of contagion is significant. We must therefore hope that the international community, led by the U.S., will act to stabilize Syria, support it economically, temper the Israeli-Turkish rivalry and, above all, protect Lebanon from the fallout of regional crises.

By Fouad Khoury-Helou

L'Orient Today