According to Kurdpress, Tom Barak, who traveled to this country, especially the Kurdistan region, at the same time as Mark Sawaya was appointed as Trump's former special representative in Iraq, is currently busy with numerous meetings with Kurdish and Iraqi politicians, which, according to a Kurdish analyst, could be a sign of his official appointment as Trump's representative in Iraq. At the same time, he is the US ambassador to Turkey and Trump's special representative in Syria, and during the negotiations between the Syrian Kurds and the Sharia government, he traveled to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and he has also made statements about the situation in Iraq.

According to Mohammad Saleh, an analyst of Kurdish issues, if Tom Barak has actually been made responsible for the Iraq case by the United States, even without an official announcement, it is a sign of Washington's new focus on Baghdad. Kurdish analyst Mohammad Saleh, in his assessment of Barak's recent three-day movements in Iraq, describes this process as "America's return to the policy of direct alignment."

According to Saleh, the list of Barak's visits carries clear political messages. In the Sunni camp, for now he only met with Mohammad al-Halbousi and refused to meet with the new speaker of the parliament, Khamis al-Khanjar and Mushani al-Samrai. According to this analyst, this selective choice shows that Washington is probably seeking to redefine its main partner among the Sunnis and is trying to re-establish Muhammad al-Halbousi as a reliable axis in the government formation process.

In contrast, Barak has met with the leaders of both of Kurdistan's main parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Mohammad Saleh considers this approach as "giving double weight to the leadership of the Kurds". According to him, this action pursues two goals: first, to prevent intra-Kurdish disputes from spreading to the federal government formation process; Second, using the capacity of the Kurdistan Region to form parliamentary coalitions in Baghdad. From his point of view, simultaneous coordination with Erbil and Sulaymaniyah shows that America does not want to ignore any of the two Kurdish poles in the new equation.

Mohammad Saleh also emphasizes that the order and priority of the meetings is an expression of Washington's initial roadmap. He says: "When you see all influential Kurdish leaders in the first stage, but such a balance is not observed among other political currents, this means that the Kurdish card plays a key role in engineering the future government."

According to this Kurdish analyst, Barak now practically plays the role of "government engineer" and may be effective in the formation of the future government of the Kurdistan Region. The composition of the next cabinet—especially in key ministries such as oil, finance, and foreign affairs—will be a clear indication of America's priorities in Iraq.

Mohammad Saleh notes in the end: "Such a level of American mobility and concentration in Iraq has been unprecedented since the time of Paul Bremer. The difference is that today the tools are less military and more political and coalition oriented. "This opportunity, if not managed carefully, can fuel domestic and regional sensitivities."