The European Union has stepped up its engagement with the Kurds in recent years, especially after ISIS invaded the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria. The union sent weapons to the Iraqi Kurds by joining the anti-ISIS coalition, but strongly opposed the holding of a referendum on the independence of the Iraqi Kurds in 2017. The 27-nation bloc failed to prevent Turkey from attacking the Syrian Kurds in 2018 and 2019, and Ankara has refuted the EU calls for the release of Turkey Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas.

"I would argue the EU has lost a lot of leverage on Turkey in the recent years. The EU accession process has been stalled for years and the perception of Turks on these developments has deteriorated and many of the judgments of the ECHR are not being implemented anymore (also in case of Demirtas)," he said about the EU failure to play an effective role in Turkey Kurdish issue.

Stressing that the union is unable to have an effective role on the Kurdish problem in Turkey, the expert stated that "The OSCE and its institutions have failed to maintain the freedom of media and to prevent the discharge of state attorneys and judges as part of the Anti-FETÖ campaign. It seems that the tools of the EU such as funding through its neighborhood programs are not enough to influence the Erdogan government on the Kurdish issue."

Underlining that the EU has failed to protect Syrian Kurds against Turkey attacks on the Kurdish regions of Syria, Seidenader pointed out that "the EU could also not retain Turkey from its military operations like Olive Branch or Peace Spring in Syria. Therefore, one can see that the EU has lost influence on the Turkish government in the last years. It is extremely sad, if one compares the situation of the negotiations in 2013-2015 between PKK and the government to today where we face a return to violent clashes like in the 1990s."

Answering the KurdPress question that why the EU countries do not help Kurds and return the ISIS European members back to Europe and instead deny to help the Kurdish self-government in northeastern Syria financially, the analyst stated: "In my view this concern is absolutely legitimate. Lawyers and NGOs in many EU member states have addressed the issue and criticized their governments for stripping foreign fighters of their citizenship and denying them even legal and consular support. The humanitarian situation in the Kurdish Syrian facilities is problematic, especially for vulnerable groups such as children and jihadist wives. Repatriation takes only place on a very limited scale and mostly only for such vulnerable groups. Studies have shown the consequences of further radicalization in prison facilities."

"While the EU has been the largest donor for humanitarian aid to Syria since 2011, only limited aid flows to the area controlled by SDF. I believe this has several reasons. There is no unity within governments of the EU how to proceed with the Syrian issue because states such as the Czech Republic and Hungary maintain good relations with Damascus and recognize it as sole government of Syria," he said about the EU help for the Kurds in Syria.

Mr. Seidenader added in this regard that: "Hence a lot of the financial support to the SDF, beyond basic humanitarian aid funded by the EU, is being rolled out via national diplomatic channels by Germany, France and others. As far as I know several EU NGO´s implement projects for instance in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and to some extent in Hasaka."

About the EU arms help to the Kurds in Iraq, the political expert said: "EU´s arms exports are a national competence, no EU competence. So in 2014 the decision to organize arms exports to the KRG was also taken differently by every EU member state, no common decision in the EU framework.

However, he pointed to the union's opposition to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 2017 Referendum of Independence and stated that "On the 2017 referendum there was again lots of disagreement within the 27 member states although the EU maintains good relations to the KRG and the current government. However, disunity and the important relations to Bagdad have probably led to this negative signals."

"Pessimistic views on the outcome of the referendum due to the contested legality of the referendum and the possible fragmentation of Iraq, but also within the KRG (PUK vs KPD vs Gorran), might have contributed, too. I recall there was also an UNSC resolution on the referendum and its impact to fight ISIL/Daesh that most of the EU member states supported," the political analyst said further about the referendum.

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