In response, Turkey praised the move and is reportedly preparing legislation to allow thousands of PKK fighters and civilians to return home from neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan.

The militant group - which also maintains a presence in Syria, Iraq, and Iran - has fought against Turkey for the creation of a Kurdish state for nearly half a century.

The withdrawal follows a historic call in February by imprisoned PKK leader and founder Abdullah Ocalan for the group to disarm and dissolve itself. The move came after Turkey revived the peace process last year, which collapsed over a decade ago.

The PKK withdrawal is merely optics, says Kurdish affairs analyst Mutlu Civiroglu, as fighters have long withdrawn from southeastern Turkey. However, according to a Turkish analyst who requested anonymity, the withdrawal of PKK fighters is “real, not symbolic,” with most having relocated to the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq.

“The PKK’s withdrawal from Türkiye seems to be a goodwill gesture rather than the outcome of a negotiated deal,” the anonymous source told The New Arab, noting the absence of official guarantees from Ankara.

While the group has not published a list of demands, they are likely to centre around political and cultural rights for Kurds alongside democratic reforms, says Civiroglu. Over the past ten years, Turkey has slid towards authoritarianism as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has consolidated power.

“Kurdish demands are very modest because the PKK used to promote an independent Kurdistan, a Greater Kurdistan - the PKK has long dropped that demand,” Civiroglu explains to TNA. “Now there are no Kurds officially [in Turkey], so one of the Kurdish demands could be the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity.”

The PKK strives for “recognition of Kurdish agency, expanded rights, and institutional guarantees - while autonomy is not an option, decentralisation, cultural freedoms, and local governance privileges are likely goals,” according to the anonymous source.

In addition, Ocalan could either take over the existing pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DAM) or establish a new political party. “What his followers want is for him to be allowed to do politics freely,” Civiroglu says.

In return, Erdogan could reap political gains amid a faltering economy. “A controlled negotiation could serve as a reputation boost, showing pragmatism to international observers while gaining Kurdish parliamentary support for constitutional changes,” the anonymous source explains.

If Erdogan plans to run for re-election, he will need to revise the constitution once again to expand term limits. In 2017, a constitutional referendum was passed to allow him to remain as head of state.

However, a peace process is not without challenges. “Erdogan’s main challenge is credibility: previous peace efforts failed, and nationalist backlash remains strong,” the anonymous source says, adding that the PKK is not a cohesive entity, which could render a unified negotiating position difficult.

“The PKK should perhaps not be understood as a singular political party, but rather as part of an interlaced and networked movement of aligned actors” in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, echoes Thomas McGee, a research fellow at the European Institute.

This raises the following questions: as the PKK withdraws from Turkey, could it double down on its presence in Iraq and Syria? If so, would Turkey tolerate a PKK presence on its borders?

Future of PKK influence in Iraq and Syria

In northern Iraq, the PKK controls two key affiliates, the People’s Defence Forces (HPG) and the Sengal Resistance Units (YBS/YJS), which maintain military bases in the Qandil Mountains and Sinjar Mountains.

In Syria, the local PKK affiliate, the People’s Defence Units (YPG), has largely been integrated into the SDF, a multiethnic fighting force founded in 2015 with the support of the United States to combat the Islamic State (IS).

Turkey has long accused the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of being a direct extension of the PKK, a talking point recently echoed by US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack.

Members of the PKK occupy key leadership positions as “kadros” in the Autonomous Administration - the de facto government in northeastern Syria - and the SDF, McGee explains. “They have been the backbone of the Autonomous Administration project in Syria…leading to its longevity much beyond most observers’ expectations.”

The Autonomous Administration first emerged in 2012 as a cluster of communes in a handful of Kurdish-majority towns in northern Syria, and grew to include Arab-majority areas of eastern Syria as the SDF conquered Islamic State territory between 2015 and 2019, with the backing of a US-led coalition. Today, it comprises an extensive network of governing councils and ministries.

Damascus has hinted that Turkey may take renewed military action against the SDF if it does not integrate with the Syrian government before the end-of-year deadline in line with the 10 March agreement.

Between 2016 and 2018, Turkey launched two offensives against the SDF - Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch - and brought northwestern Syria under the control of its Syrian proxies. Meanwhile, Turkey has continued to target PKK forces based in both Iraq and Syria.

However, Ankara cannot reach a settlement with the PKK in Turkey without also reaching one in Syria, Civiroglu argues.

“Kurds of Turkey and Kurds of Syria are two halves of one single apple,” he says, noting kinship ties. “The connection between the Kurds of Turkey and the Kurds of Syria is very deep - you cannot say we are talking reconciliation, while you continue hostility towards Syrian Kurds.”

While Ankara won’t recognise the SDF, it “may tolerate a limited presence if it is decoupled from armed activity,” the anonymous source says. Ultimately, “Ankara’s goal is isolation, not reconciliation...containment, not engagement”.

However, this is seemingly at odds with what the PKK is likely to do, McGee says.

“Should the PKK fully withdraw from Turkey, its presence is likely to increase in Syria and Iraq by the very fact that these arenas will become bigger priorities for the movement,” he explains.

“Holding onto territory in Syria would likely become an even greater priority than it already is."

Al-Arabyia