According to Kordpress, the foreign policy of the Kurds in the past century has been less the result of a strategic choice and more the product of structural vulnerability. Kurds often had to rely on external powers for survival. These alliances have been made at different times and mostly because of the promise of support, political recognition and security. These parameters seemed reasonable in the past, but the assumptions of this approach are no longer compatible with today's international order.

Washington's growing pressure to integrate the Syrian Kurdish forces into centralized government structures cannot be interpreted simply as "betrayal". This pressure is more of a structural sign than a temporary decision; It is a sign that the Kurdish elites have miscalculated in reading the international environment and understanding the nature of the powers they have relied on. The more fundamental issue is that the Kurds' foreign policy is still based on an old understanding of American power and the world order; As if neither the world nor the United States has changed..

In practice, Kurdish foreign policy has been a kind of "orientation" rather than a "strategy". Proximity to America and the West was considered both a means to reach the goal and the goal itself; Based on the belief that cooperation and shared values ​​will lead to political support. Even the huge US consulate in Erbil - which is considered the largest US consulate in the world - is more than a sign of commitment to Kurdish self-government, it is a means of Washington's greater access and influence.

It is not possible to understand American foreign policy without knowing "Americanism"; And this concept has never been fixed, coherent or morally uniform. In the early 20th century, the United States was governed domestically by racially discriminatory laws, while presenting itself globally as the architect of the liberal order. Woodrow Wilson, known as the father of liberal universalism, reinforced racial segregation policies within the federal government. Liberal cosmopolitanism abroad co-existed with racial authoritarianism domestically.

The attempt to integrate Syrian Kurdish forces into centralized government structures is the logical continuation of this view. The US has always preferred state-centered order over the autonomy of non-state actors, especially when relations with powerful regional allies have been involved. Integration is presented as pragmatism, but in practice it can weaken the Kurdish command structure and wear out their political capacity. Security without authority is fragile. Without a legal entity, identity remains symbolic.

One of the important errors has been the time error. Kurdish foreign policy still operates under the assumption that the liberal international order is intact; An order in which international law and multilateral institutions can restrain great powers. But this order has been eroding for more than a decade. The selective implementation of international law and the normalization of exceptionalism are its signs. However, Kurdish diplomacy still speaks the language of a period that is no longer decisive.

If Kurdish foreign policy is to survive, it must be rebuilt on the basis of science, which means relying on independent analysis, historical literacy, elite education, and institutional memory. Partners should be understood not as friends, but as systems with their own interests and contradictions. Moral alignment has never been a substitute for power.

The tragedy of the Kurds is not a lack of courage, but the result of the idea that the alignment of values ​​can create stable security in a system based on power. In a world where the liberal order is on the decline, the only way to maintain agency is a strategy based on knowledge, realism and turning unity into institutional power. Otherwise, the recurring surprises will continue.