According to a report by Kurdpress, following the formation of Syria’s new 210-member parliament, a key topic of discussion is the extent to which the representation of ethnic groups aligns with their actual population sizes. Dunya Bashul, a Middle East analyst, argues in a post on X (formerly Twitter) that while all ethnic groups tend to somewhat exaggerate their population figures, there are significant nuances regarding Kurds, Turkmens, and other minorities.

According to Bashul, the central issue concerns the Kurdish population and the question of whether they are underrepresented in parliament relative to their actual share of the population. She notes that, unlike in many other countries in the region, the primary areas inhabited by Syrian Kurds are well-known and documented. This is because many Kurdish-inhabited villages and towns were established during the late 19th and 20th centuries, and numerous historical sources regarding them exist.

At the same time, he criticizes the conduct of the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), noting that during their period of control, these forces never conducted an official census based on ethnic identity—a move that, in his view, could have strengthened the Kurds' future political standing.

Bashol argues that, rather than focusing on consolidating areas with genuine Kurdish majorities, YPG and SDF leaders emphasized the narrative of a "historical Kurdish presence" in areas such as Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Tabqa, and Manbij in order to justify their military presence. He believes this policy resulted in Arab-majority areas also falling under the administrative control of these forces—a development that has ultimately diminished the Kurds' political leverage.

He adds that had an ethnic census been conducted at the time and new administrative boundaries drawn based on Kurdish-majority areas, the Kurds would have stood a better chance of securing parliamentary seats in future Syrian elections. However, in his view, the current administrative boundaries—which incorporate large Arab populations into the electoral districts—work to the advantage of Arabs and the detriment of Kurds.

Bashol also believes that the YPG did not take a long-term view regarding the establishment of administrative institutions; instead of creating sustainable bureaucratic structures, it focused on projects such as "women's villages" and local councils—an approach that, in his view, hindered the emergence of an efficient bureaucratic class in Kurdish-inhabited regions.

He identifies the mass emigration of Syrian Kurds following the war as another major issue. According to him, a large number of Kurds now reside in Europe and Turkey, and many have no desire to return, as they remain concerned about insecurity, internal discord, and issues involving former YPG forces. Furthermore, even if they were to return, proving their Syrian citizenship would be difficult for many, given that a significant number of Kurds had been denied identity documents during the Ba'ath regime.

This analyst also believes that although the YPG did not represent the entirety of Syria's Kurdish community, the group's legacy has impacted the political standing of the Kurds. He notes that the YPG's hostile relationship with Turkey—now a key player in Syria—and the tensions that arose with Syrian state institutions have caused the Kurds to pay a political price during this period. According to him, the current number of Kurdish representatives in parliament is roughly equal to that of Turkmen representatives.

Regarding Syria's Turkmen population, Bashol writes that existing estimates vary widely; some cite a figure of four million, while others estimate the population at only 100,000 to 200,000—though he believes none of these figures are accurate.

He also predicts that the Druze community will be underrepresented in parliament relative to its demographic size, a result of its ties to Israel and the preservation of autonomy in Druze regions in recent years. Regarding the Circassians, he believes that although their number of representatives is small, the community will retain significant influence within the Syrian military and bureaucracy.

Bashul concludes that while Kurds and Turkmens currently hold approximately 12 seats each in the new Syrian parliament, their actual political weight will not be equal in the future, given differences in identity cohesion, geographic distribution, and demographic trends.