President Donald Trump met in Davos, Switzerland, with both Iraqi Kurdish President Nechirvan Barzani and Iraqi President Barham Salih. Looming large in their talks was Iraq’s political future, Iran, and U.S. alliances in the region. Behind-the-scenes, much of the talk appears to center on a Trump administration push to forgo any more investment in Iraq, and to instead double down militarily in Iraqi Kurdistan. It’s a bad idea.
The problem of Iraqi politics
It has been a rough month for U.S.-Iraqi relations: Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias killed an American contractor in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. Many of the same militias, acting on orders from Iranian controllers and paymasters, then tried to storm the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Just three days later, U.S. forces killed Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani as he and militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis drove along Baghdad’s airport express road. Many Iraqis were outraged at the violation of Iraqi sovereignty and, in Muhandis’ case, at a death of an Iraqi military man killed deliberately by Americans on Iraqi soil.
Iraqi politics, chaotic at the best of times, made matters worse. Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned in the face of countrywide protests about both government corruption, inefficiency and Iranian influence. Too many Iraqi leaders treat the constitution more as a suggestion than the law. While there was a 15-day window to appoint a new prime minister, Iraqi leaders are still bickering over who that should be. Abdul-Mahdi and pro-Iran faction leaders, however, saw an opportunity in chaos. They used the killings of Soleimani and al-Muhandis to demand U.S. forces leave Iraq.
The U.S. media proceeded to misreport what happened next: The Iraqi parliament voted not to demand U.S. forces leave, but rather than the prime minister provide a plan for the removal of all foreign forces. There were three problems even with this, however: First, the Iraqi parliament likely did not have a quorum; second, the vote was non-binding; and, third, with the 15-day period for Abdul-Mahdi to act as a lame duck premier expired, he did not have the constitutional authority to act on the question, even if he did have a quorum. Certainly, though, U.S. forces should not stay where they are not wanted. Here, Iraqi cynicism was on full display as many Shi’ite politicians affirmed privately what they feared saying publicly: They want U.S. training programs to continue and the cooperation the United States provides in the fight against any Islamic State resurgence. One of these leaders may very well become prime minister, especially as the Iranian “veto” has significantly diminished since Soleimani’s death. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s greed and corruption disqualifies him from any come-back. Badr Corps leader Hadi Ameri may seek to become the political voice for Iranian interests in Iraq but he, too, is limited in what he can achieve.
The parliamentary vote and statements condemning the United States and praising Soleimani, however, caused fury in the White House and State Department. President Donald Trump saw ingratitude. The U.S. Embassy went into lockdown and ceased most functions. The irony here, of course, is that might have been Iran’s intention from the start: When, in 2018, an Iranian militia launched a rocket in the general direction of the U.S. consulate in Basra, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ordered the consulate’s evacuation, effectively fulfilling Iran’s goals.
Abandoning Baghdad for a Kurdish Alliance would Backfire
Against this backdrop, the State Department appears to be pursuing a Kurdish option. On January 9 and 10, 2020, Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker, for example, traveled to the Iraqi Kurdish capital Erbil, but skipped Baghdad. According to a read-out of his visit, he met only with Kurdish and Sunni politicians. That is the diplomatic equivalent of visiting the West Bank but skipping Israel, or visiting Crimea but ignoring Ukraine.
The Iraqi Kurds, meanwhile, are happy to fan the flames. The Barzani family has always had close relations with Abdul-Mahdi. It was Abdul-Mahdi who, as finance and oil minister, bumped the Kurdish share of Iraqi oil up to 17 percent from 13 percent, netting Iraqi Kurdistan and the Barzani family several billion dollars. Whereas other prime ministers played hardball with regard to accounting disputes about Iraqi Kurdistan’s own oil sales, Abdul-Mahdi basically gave the Barzanis everything they wanted. This is why, in recent meetings with Kurdish officials in Erbil, the Kurdish officials bent over backwards to absolve Abdul-Mahdi of any responsibility for the current crisis and suggest that the more fundamental problem was the Iraqi system.
As the Barzani government was when they embraced Saddam Hussein (to weaken the rival Talabanis), helped arm the Islamic State (to weaken Maliki), when they betrayed the Yezidis of Sinjar (to weaken Kurdish opposition), and when they hoarded and warehoused weaponry meant for the battle against the Islamic State (in order to wield them against more local rivals), the Kurdish government is deeply cynical. They lay out the red carpet for visiting Americans, but they also lay it out for the Iranians. Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdish representative in Tehran has called the Americans “occupiers” and Kurdish leaders have affirmed Iranian propaganda about the “lies that led to war.”
Enter Kurdish leaders and lobbyists, who have apparently convinced some in the Trump administration that Baghdad is irredeemable and that the United States should cast its lot firmly with the Kurds. The irony here is that the Kurds are quietly throwing fuel on the fire. Abdul-Mahdi has made a devil’s bargain with Iran: He will have Iranian support for a political comeback in exchange for committing himself to expel Americans. This would not resolve the crisis, but would rather cause it to explode as the Iraqi street will not tolerate Abdul-Mahdi or any others from the older, corrupt class.
Iraqi Kurdish officials are simultaneously dangling a permanent U.S. base in their region so that U.S. forces can both continue to support their anti-Islamic State mission and “keep an eye” on Iran. Superficially, it sounds compelling, sort of like then-Senator Joe Biden’s plan to divide Iraq into ethnic and sectarian thirds. In reality, it will neither work nor make the region safe and secure.
Firstly, withdrawing forces to Iraqi Kurdistan simply cedes the bulk of Iraq to Iran. This is counterproductive, because most Iraqis—including Shi’ites—resent Iran. It would also snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, as a younger generation of Iraqis reject Iran’s violent policy and vision of the world. (That does not, of course, mean they want U.S. domination). Iranians run roughshod over Iraqi nationalism. What Iraqis want is the means to resist Iran. The easiest way to provide that means is with U.S. presence. While U.S. forces—currently deployed away from population centers and focused on the battle against the Islamic State—play a role, of far greater import would be an investment (rather than aid) strategy to help Iraq wean itself away from Iran. Those who have invested in Iraq have made windfall profits for the country, despite its problems, has tremendous human and natural resources.
If Trump effectively surrenders Iraq and doubles down on Iraqi Kurdistan, the net result will be an empowered Iran able to expand its malign influence more easily around the Persian Gulf. Small U.S. allies will gauge the momentum and conclude they must make an accommodation with Tehran.
Overreliance on the Kurds would further conflict
Nor have the Kurds ever provided a solution. First, there is geography. A U.S. base in Iraqi Kurdistan would be surrounded by Iran, pro-Iranian Syria, a hostile and unreliable Turkey, and a rump Iraqi state that would have no reason to do the U.S. any favors. Logistically, it would be a nightmare.
Then there is Iraqi Kurdistan itself. The region may be shiny and its officials may have mastered the rhetoric of democracy, but they are effectively a family-led police state not unlike Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. They rule more by fear and financial co-option than by adulation and respect. Kurdish leaders themselves worry about their future stability. Their tactic of increasingly clamping down trade short-term stability for long-term chaos. A U.S. base may simply encourage the Barzani family to crack down more, believing Washington would protect them against their own people. That’s not a position into which Trump should put the United States, for it would either turn the Kurdish public against the United States or undercut the base’s utility.
In reality, the Barzani family looks at a U.S. baseless as a means to defeat the Islamic State and more as a ‘get out of jail free’ card on bad behavior. They seek to treat a U.S. presence much like Qatar and Turkey have. True, Iraqi Kurdistan does not export Islamist radicalism as Qatar and Turkey do, but there are other problems: Baghdad and Erbil still dispute significant territory. The areas where the Islamic State risks resurgence are technically under Baghdad’s control. If the Kurds are promising that they can use a Kurdish base to fight the Islamic State, they are basically trying to pull a fast one on Trump by seeking to extend Kurdish control into disputed areas. This is not something a pro-Iran rump state would tolerate and would drag the United States into further conflict.
The State Department and Pentagon are naïve if they believe that Sunni buy-in would make their plan more realistic. The Sunni Arab community generally faces a capacity and credibility problem. To negotiate with figures in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, or politicians who believe their path to power rests more in Washington and London than Ramadi and Mosul is to double-down on past mistakes. To look at Iraq—a concept of identity which has existed in Islamic literature dating back to the 13th century—only in terms of sectarian groups is to miss both the growing post-sectarian moment in Iraq and to ignore just how transitory ethnic and sectarian politics can be in Iraq.
To win Iraq, play the long game
Washington likes to panic, but time is on the U.S. side. Crises come and go in Iraq, and Iraqis move on. Recent history should show just how politically resilient Iraqis are. Forty percent of Iraqis were born after the 2003 Iraq war and are unwilling to accept kleptocracy or repression in the name of religion. The Islamic Republic, meanwhile, faces a looming transition which may not go smoothly. If Trump believes Tehran destabilizes the region, then the best recourse he can undertake is to stay. Iranian leaders fear not political reformists—they are essentially just the good cop to the bad cop represented by Supreme Leader Khamenei and Soleimani, but rather Iraqi political and religious freedom. This is why Tehran so desperately wants to force the United States out, and why ding so would be the greatest gift to the Islamic Republic since the French facilitated revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on February 1, 1979.
This does not mean endless war; far from it. The U.S. military is doing a fine job in its partnership with both Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish forces and should maintain that status quo. Diplomatically, the U.S. mission is a disaster, part of a broader post-Benghazi problem in which the State Department’s risk averse posture undercuts any ability to actually conduct real diplomacy. Economically, the U.S. has also fallen flat as it has not answered the Iraqi call to invest. State Department travel warnings raise insurance while diplomats themselves know little of the opportunities they could push as they remain bottled up behind high embassy and consulate walls. (Other embassies, for example, allow their diplomats to travel to safer neighborhoods with less unwieldy security and save the huge security footprint for dangerous districts or in response to specific threats). When it comes to information operations, the U.S. strategy is likewise dead on arrival.
Magic formulas and magic thinking are the bane of U.S. strategy. The State Department should resist its latest iteration and work to stabilize and liberalize Iraq rather than undercut it.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
The National Interest