According to Kurdpress, a new analysis of New Lines magazine shows that the relations between the new Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Shara and Turkey, although it has become an official alliance after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but it is still a tense relationship, based on mutual dependence and disagreement over the future of Kurdish regions in Syria. This report emphasizes that while Damascus is trying to reduce its dependence on Ankara, it still needs Türkiye's military and intelligence support to stabilize the country's security and control.

According to this analysis, the main issue between the two sides is how to deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the influence of the Kurds in the north and east of Syria. Turkey considers the SDF to be a direct threat to its national security due to the organic connection of parts of it with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and has organized its affiliated armed groups in the form of the "Syrian National Army" to counter it for years.

According to New Lines, after the fall of Assad in December 2024, Turkey tried to direct its affiliated forces to the Kurdish-controlled areas, but the commanders of many of these groups preferred to participate in the advance operation towards Damascus instead of fighting the SDF. This difference even led to a kind of disobedience among the forces supported by Ankara. The report says that although the Tahrir al-Sham Board succeeded in overthrowing the Assad regime without the direct support of Türkiye, the new Syrian government still depends on Ankara to maintain stability and manage security structures. Türkiye now plays a central role in training Syrian army and police forces, providing security information and drone support.

According to this report, Turkish drones provided field information and operational support to Syrian forces in the Damascus military operations against the Alawite rebellions on the Syrian coast in March 2025, as well as in the January 2026 large-scale attack against the SDF in eastern Syria.

Newlines also reveals that Türkiye still maintains more than 100 military bases in northern Syria and has made the full withdrawal of its forces conditional on the "removal of the PKK threat." Although Damascus currently considers stabilization of internal security and lifting of sanctions as its priority, it describes the presence of foreign bases, including Türkiye, America, Russia, and Israel, as an unresolved issue.

Another part of this analysis states that the long negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to integrate the Kurdish forces into the Syrian army came to an end only after the sudden attack of the government forces on the Arab areas of eastern Syria in January 2026. Following the fall of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and parts of Hasakah, the SDF was forced to accept a much weaker deal than Damascus' initial offers.

According to American and Syrian sources cited by Newlines, Turkey wanted to continue military operations against the SDF even after the fall of Assad, but the new Syrian government opposed the expansion of the war and deployed HTS-affiliated forces along the lines of contact to prevent further advances by Turkish-backed forces.

This report also emphasizes that Ahmad al-Shora's government, contrary to popular belief, is not merely subject to Ankara's policies and is trying to distance itself from full dependence on Turkey by expanding relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab actors. However, the weakness of security structures and the threat of multiple rebellions in Syria have made Ankara remain the most important security partner of Damascus.

New Lines analysis concludes that the relationship between Türkiye and the new rulers of Syria is not a relationship based on obedience, but a forced partnership based on mutual interests; A partnership whose future is largely tied to the fate of the Syrian Kurds, the position of the SDF and the level of Turkish influence in the Syrian security structure.