According to KurdPress, more than three decades have passed since the first parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992, but according to Goran Azad, the most important challenges to democracy in this region still remain unanswered.He believes that the main problem is not simply the differences between the KDP and the PUK, but the fact that political issues have always been defined through the lens of the interests of the two parties; in such a way that whenever they reach an agreement, even major differences fade, and whenever their relations sour, the smallest differences turn into political crises. According to this analyst, after the first parliamentary elections in 1992, the dispute over the election results ended with an agreement on equal power-sharing. The “50-50” formula was designed to prevent conflict, but it failed to prevent a bloody civil war between the two parties between 1994 and 1998.After the Washington Agreement in 1998, and especially after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, it was expected that the political structure of the region would be rebuilt based on democratic institutions and the rule of law, but in practice the same logic of power-sharing through a “strategic agreement” between the two parties continued. According to the author, during these years, neither of the two parties moved away from the logic of “dominance or full equality”; meaning that they either sought political supremacy or insisted on being recognized as fully equal partners.

This approach has now also manifested itself in the form of the debate over the “39-39” formula and the new coalition between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the New Generation Movement.Some consider this coalition a turning point in regional politics, but Goran Azad believes that the main issue is not the number of seats or the share of each party, but the power-sharing system itself; a structure that was formed to manage competition between parties for power and resources, not to secure public interests and strengthen democratic institutions.

Goran Azad goes on to point out the role of opposition parties, writing that the Goran (Change) Movement and later the New Generation Movement were formed in response to this same power structure. However, today some of these movements are also seeking a new version of the same power-sharing model. According to him, although the power-sharing ratio has changed from “50-50” to “39-39”, the logic governing it has not changed.

According to Goran Azad, if the current coalition between the Patriotic Union and the New Generation is simply to force the Democratic Party to accept the Patriotic Union as an equal partner, it will remain within the same traditional framework. On the other hand, if the Democratic Party, relying on its political influence and support networks, forms rival coalitions, it will reproduce the same pattern that it criticizes.

The analyst sees the way out of the impasse in reforming the rules of the political game. In his opinion, one of the two main parties must be prepared to cede executive power and accept the role of a real opposition; of course, on the condition that opposition does not mean complete removal from the political structure.

In the end, the author concludes that the Kurdistan Region needs a new “social contract” to overcome its chronic crises; one that is based on trust in democratic rules, not on ad hoc agreements between political elites. In his opinion, as long as weapons, areas of influence, security forces, and economic resources remain in the hands of the parties, and as long as parliament and legal institutions do not play a decisive role, each election will only result in a repetition of the same political bargaining between the Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union. In such circumstances, the “50-50” or “39-39” formulas may be able to prevent immediate crises, but they will not be able to transform the Kurdistan Region into a democratic and sustainable political system.

Amarji Magazine