“Considering the difference in goals and personalities, Trump may be slightly better placed than Biden because Biden's NATO commitment will ultimately bind his administration to Turkey more strongly than Trump's alleged personal affection for Erdogan. Also, though both leaders have made concessions to Turkey in Syria, Biden was in charge when Daesh rose to prominence,” Political Science and International Relations analyst at the University of Southern California, Michael R Pfonner, told KurdPress in an interview.

What follows are his answers to KurdPress questions;

Who is a better American president for Iraqi and Syrian Kurds? Trump or Biden?

They each have their own possibilities and drawbacks. On one hand, the Trump administration has given significant amounts of assistance to the Peshmerga and to the Shervan of the YPG/SDF in their fights against Daesh (ISIS), far more than the Obama-Biden administration had considered. On the other hand, the Trump administration allowed Baghdad to retake the disputed territories from Erbil in response to the 2017 independence referendum. It also withdrew protection for Rojava around Gir-e-Spi/Tal Abyad and Sere Kaniye / Ras al-Ayn in response to the Turkish and Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army incursion during Operation Peace Spring last year.

Reasons for being optimistic for a second Trump as it relates to Rojava revolve around the administration's desire to maintain stability in the region. The Trump administration did not leave all of Rojava, but rather the areas around the corridor that Turkey wanted. After the backlash against such a concession it is possible that the Trump administration would not offer up more in the future to avoid another outcry. For Bakur, the continuing threat of Daesh and the precarious relationship the US has with the Hashd al-Shaabi means that the Peshmerga are going to be favored military partners for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the hostility between the Trump administration on one hand and Iran with elements of the Hashd al-Shaabi on the other side may mean that Iranian influence over Kurdish political parties, and especially the PUK, may be lessened. However, it could become stronger if the administration does not make this a priority.

There are reasons to be pessimistic about another Trump term. In Rojava, the administration may again force the PYD to make concessions to Turkey should they decide to invade once more. In Bakur, the administration may prefer Baghdad to assume permanent control of some of the disputed territories, which could make the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution impossible given the demographic changes in places like Kirkuk.

Biden has a mixed record when it comes to Rojava and Bashur, but, in contrast to Trump, his record is much longer. He has frequently voiced support for Kurds and has a good relationship with Masoud Barzani (former Kurdistan Region president and the Leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party). However, he seems to make no distinction between different groups of Kurds, whether those groups are political as in the case between the KNC-affiliated groups and the KCK-affiliated groups, national, as in the differences between Kurds in Iraq and Iran, or demographic, such as the Kurmanji / Sorani distinction among many.

On the plus side, he negotiated to get Turkey to withdraw from Iraq in the 1990s when they were combating the PKK/HPG and has tried to have Kurdish interests in Iraq respected by Baghdad. The Obama-Biden administration was slow to support the YPG in Kobani, but ultimately did so, which led to a successful defense of Rojava.

On the negative side, he has also made territorial concessions to Turkey in Syria, he negotiated for the 2011 troop withdrawal from Iraq that allowed Daesh to rise, and was in charge of US policy in Iraq when Daesh took Shingal/Sinjar and Mosul, and Daesh threatened Heseke, Qamishlo, and even Erbil. The US did not respond until Baghdad itself was threatened.

The reason for being optimistic with regards to a Biden presidency is that he has very pro-Kurdish rhetoric. The reason for pessimism is that the results have not matched the rhetoric. Biden's desire to normalize relations with NATO countries may mean that Syrian Kurds will be made to make more concessions.

On balance, it seems like either is likely to make concessions to Turkey in Syria. Considering the difference in goals and personalities, Trump may be slightly better placed than Biden because Biden's NATO commitment will ultimately bind his administration to Turkey more strongly than Trump's alleged personal affection for Erdogan. Also, though both leaders have made concessions to Turkey in Syria, Biden was in charge when Daesh rose to prominence.

Trump may also be slightly better for some Kurds in Iraq because he does not have a personal relationship with the Barzanis. The KDP is very important, but supporters of New Generation, Gorran, and the PUK might be skeptical of such a relationship, which Biden does have. Neither leader was going to support the KRG's independence referendum- both of them have said as much and both will continue to see the Kurds as less than full partners. However, the Trump administration will likely continue supporting the Peshmerga out of fear of Iranian influence, while Biden may be willing to relinquish such support in exchange for Iranian cooperation over nuclear weapons.

What are the consequences of electing Joe Biden in Iraq, regarding American relations with Baghdad and Erbil and the process of American soldiers going home?

The continued presence of American troops will likely be conditional for either a Trump or Biden administration. If the Hashd al-Shaabi is integrated into the Iraqi military successfully and Iranian influence is curtailed, troop reductions are likely to occur. A small contingent of special operations forces will likely remain to conduct foreign internal defense and counterterrorism operations. The Peshmerga will benefit from this presence and training, perhaps more so than the Iraqi military, since few elements will be able to participate in comparison to the Peshmerga. The difference with a Biden administration concerns the presence of American troops as a bargaining chip in talks with Iran. If Iran re-enters the nuclear agreement and satisfies a Biden administration's demands, then a larger, or even total, troop withdrawal could be possible.

How do you see the Erbil-Baghdad agreement regarding normalizing the situation in Sinjar?

This is a very unfortunate situation. On one hand, this is a possible opportunity to stop Turkish bombings of the HPG/YPG/YBS/ and could bring stability to the region. Considering that many Ezidi have been returning to the area, they desperately need security and services. However, it does not appear that Ezidi leaders were consulted over the agreement. This may lead to problems. There are units of Ezidi Hashd al-Shaabi that might be integrated into the regular security services, and there are some Ezidi Peshmerga that command a great deal of respect. However, the perception of Erbil amongst many Ezidi is not very positive at the moment and their opinion of Baghdad may also decline given the insufficient consultation over their future. Erbil will have to make sincere efforts at repairing the relations with that community. However, if done properly it can lead to stability.

The sticking point is the presence of PKK/KCK-affiliated groups. Many Ezidi are grateful to them for risking their lives to open up a corridor from the mountains to safety in Syria and for helping them take their homeland back from Daesh. No matter what happens, it will be difficult to convince Turkey that there is no more PKK influence in the area.

Reporter’s code: 50101