According to Kurdpress, Dr. Sardar Aziz, an expert on Kurdish issues, wrote in an article that the political opposition in the Kurdistan region of Iraq is known by a word taken from the French language, namely L'opposition; The concept that shows that this phenomenon is relatively new and imported in the Kurdish political context. Like many modern political concepts, the opposition does not have a long history in the traditional power structure in Kurdistan.

In the years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government and the formation of the new structure of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, although there were political differences and competitions, for a long time there was no news of an official and parliamentary opposition outside of the dominant and armed parties.

The appearance of Goran; The turning point of non-armed policy

This situation changed with the emergence of "Goran Movement" (Change) in 2009. Goran was considered a fundamental development in unarmed political organization, political discourse, media and social mobilization in the Kurdistan Region.

Before that, the "Islamic Union of Kurdistan" established in 1994 was the first serious attempt to create an opposition. This party, which was rooted in the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, joined a broad coalition of Kurdish parties in 2005, but soon left it and operated independently. The approach of this trend was more focused on the gradual reform of society and family as the main core of politics. However, its ambiguous and complex political identity made it unintelligible to a large part of society.

Noshirvan Mustafa; Charisma and its limitations

Noshirvan Mustafa was an experienced and influential politician. He had leftist tendencies and was once close to Maoist ideas. The experience of living in London during the Kurdish civil war in the 1990s brought him closer to the British model of parliamentary democracy. In the beginning, Goran was more like a political, economic and social think tank than a traditional party. This movement initially caused a great shock to the political system of the region, but it could not maintain its voter base in the long term and today it is no longer represented in the Iraqi parliament. Goran's identity was based on "being the opposition"; It means self-definition outside the power structure.

The era after Goran; Predominance of faces over institutions

In the period after Goran's decline, new parties and currents continued to use its slogans and political style, but actually moved towards traditional and person-centered patterns. Political literature became more popular and the circle of decision-making narrower.

"New Generation Movement" founded in 2017 by Kurdish businessman "Shaswar Abdolvahid" was the most important movement of this period. Shasvar had two key tools of climate politics at his disposal: wealth and private media (NRT network). However, he lacked a clear political agenda and his outlook was based on the idea that everyone could become rich; An attractive idea in a society that has become urbanized rapidly and wealth has a high social value.

Ali Hama Saleh and the decline of new currents

Another prominent figure of the opposition was Ali Hame Saleh, who assumed the leadership of the Patriotic Position Movement (NSM) in 2024. This flow was also highly dependent on his personal popularity. The parliamentary group of this movement was dissolved in the parliament of the region and practically this party also withdrew from the political scene.

Why was the climate opposition weakened?

According to the author, the opposition of the Kurdistan Region is now in a state of decline. The most important reasons for this situation are:

Inability to unite and provide a real alternative

Predominance of personality and political opportunism

Influence, pressure and buying loyalty by ruling parties

Turning democracy into a market for trading votes

Weakening institutions such as parliament

Monopolization of wealth and power by the main parties

What is the way out?

According to the author, the formation of an effective opposition in the Kurdistan region requires extensive civic education; That the society knows what democracy is, what is the role of the opposition, and how the government and the opposition can work together within the framework of the law.

In the society of the region, there are widespread dissatisfactions in economic, political, security and identity fields. But these dissatisfactions have not yet turned into a coherent political force. The realization of this requires expanding citizenship rights, strengthening the sense of social agency and equal opportunities.

The biggest hit: the spread of public cynicism

In the end, the author emphasizes that the biggest blow to the political opposition in the Kurdistan region is the spread of "cynicism" or pervasive pessimism in the society; The belief that nothing changes, nothing matters and everything is negotiable.

In such an environment, a part of the society takes refuge in insults on social networks, a part withdraws from the public arena, and some simply follow the prevailing trends. The result is the further strengthening of the forces that have the tools of power, wealth and influence at their disposal.