KurdistanPress

The test of sovereignty against a power vacuum

The end of the international coalition mission on September 30 is seen as a “strategic turning point” in the political and security history of modern Iraq.This juncture is not simply a declaration of the end of the foreign military presence, but rather a new window on complex questions about the identity of new actors and how to fill the “geopolitical vacuum” that will remain after the coalition.

While Baghdad reinforces the discourse of “self-reliance” and the readiness of domestic security forces, in reality, the government faces a difficult test; a test in which the concept of sovereignty is confronted with a set of multifaceted obstacles, the most important of which are: the issue of weapons outside the control of the state, the polycentricity of security decision-making, the instability of Syria’s borders, and the deepening competition between regional poles around Iraq.This study provides an analysis of the “power map” in the post-exit phase and attempts to answer the fundamental question: Will Iraq move towards state-centered stability or will it once again become an arena for “proxy” conflict?

1. Transition to a bilateral partnership

In a decisive step, the Iraqi government has emphasized that September 30, 2026, is the “unchangeable and final” date for the end of the international coalition’s military mission (Al-Madi, 2026).

This decision, based on intensive understandings of the “U.S.-Iraqi High Military Committee,” is not simply a temporal shift of forces, but a “redefinition of the relationship between Baghdad and Washington” (U.S. Department of War, 2026).

Here, Iraq moves from the phase of "Operation Resolute Resolve (OIR)" and a multilateral international coalition, to the phase of "Bilateral Security Partnership" within the framework of the "SOFA" agreement signed in 2008.This major shift will shift Iraq’s security environment from “international protection” to “national responsibility,” with the U.S. presence shifting from a combat and deterrent force to an advisory and support force (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

This will challenge Iraq to balance regional forces without the direct umbrella of a coalition.

2. “The Shadow of 2011 and the Test of 2026”

It is impossible to read the 2026 withdrawal without returning to the “trauma of 2011.”

That year, Iraq bid farewell to U.S. forces at a time when the country was at the height of political divisions and parliamentary deadlock; some 170,000 U.S. troops had left Iraq (France 24, 2011).

The vacuum that remained became a fertile ground for the emergence of ISIS and extremist groups, endangering not only the security of Iraq but also the entire Middle East (Zarafa, 2016, pp. 39–65).But the fundamental difference this time is that if in 2011 the threat was “foreign terrorism and non-state actors”, in 2026 the threat is more complex.

Now the threat of ISIS has diminished, but in its place, the “multi-centered phenomenon of armed power” and the influence of provincial groups have emerged.

The threat is not just a security vacuum, but the risk of this vacuum being filled by informal armed groups; an issue that places the Iraqi government between two millstones: “national sovereignty” and “influence of informal groups”.

3. The map of the internal conflict of the Shiites in Iraq after the withdrawal

The Shiite armed groups in Iraq are not a monolithic unit; they are a complex network of political interests and ideological affiliations.

Faced with the issues of “limiting weapons”, “delivering weapons” and how to deal with the phase after the coalition’s withdrawal, the map of these groups is divided into three different paths.

4. Tehran and Iraq after the withdrawal; “Shiite nationalism” beyond the state

Behind the scenes of all these different currents, a unified Iranian strategy can be seen: maintaining weapons as a guarantee of dominance.

After the rapid changes in Syria and the pressures on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraq has now become the “last strategic bastion” for Tehran.

The political discourse of these groups has changed from “nationalism” to “Shiite nationalism.”

For Tehran, the weapons of the provincial groups in Iraq are part of Iran’s national security (Al-Sa’a Network, 2026).

Meanwhile, available information shows that Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, emphasized preventing any armed conflict with the Iraqi security forces during his last unannounced trip to Iraq, but at the same time, he also rejected handing over the groups’ weapons, because he considered this demand to be imposed by the United States.It has also called on them to keep their weapons as a preventive measure against US threats against the “axis of resistance” (Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, 2026; Shafaq News, 2026).

5. The consequences of the Mecca Triangle on Iraq

The signing of the “Mecca Agreement” on August 7, 2026 between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan was a major geopolitical move that could redraw the balance of power in the region and around Iraq.

This coalition is depicted as creating a “triangle” in which the principle of “collective defense” is pursued.

Here, Iraq and the armed groups find themselves facing a new reality: theoretically, any attack on Saudi Arabia would mean Turkey and Pakistan joining the defending side, as this is explicitly stated in the text of the agreement (BBC, 2026).

This limits the room for maneuver of the “provincial” groups in the region.

6.The Shadow of Turkey and Syria; Concerns about a “Second Idlib” in Iraq

While Tehran and its allies call the “Sunni” coalition of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan a “symbolic step,” inside Iraq, figures close to the Iranian axis, such as “Faleh Khazali,” warn of a major danger.

The main concern of Shiite centers is that Turkey, with the support of this coalition, will repeat the “Idlib and Damascus” scenario in Mosul and Kirkuk (Al-Rabee’a, 2026).

This concern, along with the emergence of a “new Syria” led by Sunnis (Ahmad Al-Sharaa), has become an “existential threat” that could call into question Baghdad’s entire political plan.

7. Washington’s plan to separate Iraq from Iran

In addition to the issue of the groups’ weapons, Washington, through its envoy (Tom Barak), is developing a multifaceted economic plan to “remove Iraq from Iran’s orbit.”The new oil pipeline project between Iraq and Syria – which was discussed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington – is not just a commercial project, but an attempt to:

Reduce the strategic importance of the “Strait of Hormuz”, where Iran uses it as a leverage card;

Create a “new strategic corridor” connecting Iraq to the Gulf, Syria and Turkey (Network 964: 2026).

This US vision for Iraq after September 30 emphasizes “Iraq’s economic integration with Iran’s rivals”.

Here, Iraq is faced with two contrasting options: either become part of this “new global network” and benefit from the economic revival, or remain on the “isolated fringe” due to its political and ideological dependence on Tehran and become a victim of the competition between the poles.

8.The Zaidi government's plan for the post-coalition period

The Iraqi government headed by Ali Zaidi has not relied solely on agreements for the post-September 30 phase, but has adopted a "multi-pronged" strategy.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis conducted in this study, the results can be summarized as follows:

1. The transition to a “bilateral partnership” with Washington means that Iraq can no longer remain under the “shadow of international protection.”

The responsibility to confront the remnants of ISIS and contain armed groups is now a purely national task.

Any failure in this test will bring back the shadow of 2011 and the reemergence of a security vacuum.

2. The division of armed groups into the “tactical commitment” and “radical rejection” fronts indicates that the logic of “weapons above the state” continues to be a serious threat.

The emergence of “shadow nuclei” affiliated with Tehran shows that Iraq remains an arena for a “proxy” conflict; a conflict that aims to tie Iraq’s fate to the interests of “Shiite nationalism” and regional axes.

3.The signing of the “Mecca Agreement” and the dramatic developments in Syria have placed Iraq between two millstones: either getting caught up in a regional conflict that will lead to international isolation, or joining the “new energy and economic routes” that the United States and its new regional allies, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the new Syria, intend to create to reduce Iranian influence and the importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

4. The actions of the Zaidi government through the “legal consensus”, “activating the office of the commander in chief” and “implementing the anti-terrorism law”, show that the executive branch has concluded that silence is no longer an option.

The government is trying to present the armed groups with the choice of “commitment or confrontation” through a combination of “hard power” and “soft diplomacy”.Conclusion

After September 30, Iraq needs a “new security agreement”; one in which the decision on war and peace rests solely with the government.

Iraq’s future depends on the extent to which it can free itself from “following Iran” and become an independent player in the new equations of the Middle East.

If Baghdad cannot control or resolve its internal weapons and maintain its balance between regional poles, September 30 will become the beginning of a more complex phase of instability and internal conflict, rather than a day of “sovereignty.”