However, the downing of a Turkish armed drone by the United States in Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria on Thursday weakens the likelihood of Turkey launching a ground offensive in the region after dozens of airstrikes this week. 

The outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — which has fought Ankara since 1984 and is designated as a "terrorist" group by Turkey and much of the international community — claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Ankara on Sunday.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan asserted that the two assailants came from Syria, where Kurdish control of areas along the Turkish border is seen as a threat to Turkey’s national security. Ankara considers the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — Washington’s chief ally in the fight against the Islamic State — a "terrorist" group as well due to the links between its main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the PKK. 

SDF commander Mazlum Abdi denied Fidan’s accusation. “We are not party to Turkey’s internal conflict nor we encourage escalation,” Abdi wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter, charging that Ankara was looking for pretexts to legitimize its attack on the de facto Kurdish-led autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. 

US, Russia 2019 deals put to test

In 2019, the United States and Russia stepped in to halt Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring after it took control of the Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain areas along the border. The deal with the United States called for the YPG’s withdrawal to a distance of 32 kilometers (19 miles) from the border in the 120-kilometer (74-mile) stretch between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain. The deal with Russia similarly envisaged the pullout of YPG forces to a depth of 30 kilometers and the deployment of Syrian troops and Russian military police in the area, in addition to the YPG’s removal from Manbij and Tell Rifat to the west. The YPG’s withdrawal from Manbij was also a commitment that Washington made verbally.

Drawing on the two deals, Turkey has been pressing the United States and Russia on further curbing Kurdish control on the ground. In Manbij, the YPG has been replaced with the Manbij Military Council and elsewhere with Asayish, the police force of the self-rule administration, but Ankara is hardly satisfied.

Erdogan has repeatedly threatened a fresh ground offensive on the grounds that the deals have not been properly implemented, though Turkish operations have been limited to air raids and shelling across the border thus far. 

Speaking shortly after the Ankara attack, Erdogan reiterated his goal of creating a 30-kilometer-deep safe zone along Turkey’s southern borders with Syria and Iraq, but his remarks did not seem to signal an imminent ground offensive. “The steps that we are going to take are only a matter of preparation, time and conditions,” he said. 

Since then, Turkey has bombed numerous targets in Syria as well as an array of mountainous areas in northern Iraq known to be home to PKK bases. 

Fidan warned Thursday that “all infrastructure, superstructure facilities and energy facilities held by the PKK/YPG in Iraq and Syria are now legitimate targets” for Turkey’s security forces and intelligence agency. Referring to US, Russian and Syrian forces deployed alongside the SDF in various areas, he added, “I advise third parties to stay away from PKK/YPG facilities or individuals.”

Fidan’s warning was followed by dozens of Turkish drone strikes that targeted power stations, an oil and gas facility, and other infrastructure in Syria’s Hasakah and Qamishli regions. 

How far Ankara could go depends on US and Russian red lines. Ankara hopes to capitalize on American flexibility and Russian understanding at a time when Washington is awaiting the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership and Moscow is under strain due to the war in Ukraine. 

Yet both the United States and Russia have recently shown that they remain opposed to any moves that could disrupt the state of affairs on the ground. Last month, Turkey tried to take advantage of the tribal uprising against the SDF in Deir Ezzor and open new fronts to the west of the Euphrates River. The United States, however, used its influence to defuse the conflict between the rebel Arab tribes and the SDF, while Russia employed air power to stop Turkish-backed militia from advancing to areas where the Syrian army is also present.

Syria is the essential point of potential tensions between Turkey and the United States. Ankara insists that Washington should cut its support for the SDF. But ending collaboration with the SDF could undermine the conditions for a continued US military presence in northeastern Syria, to which the Biden administration remains committed.

Washington's dilemma

As on previous occasions, the expectation was that Washington would again acquiesce to limited Turkish air raids in northeastern Syria that do not endanger its troops in the area. A State Department spokesman said on Wednesday that Washington lacked adequate information to confirm Turkey’s claim that the Ankara assailants came from Syria. That cautious approach raised the prospect of US warnings or moves to restrain Turkey after a while. 

The most serious possible warning came on Thursday as a US fighter jet shot down a Turkish armed drone that came within 500 meters (546 yards) of the US base in Hasakah. US officials described the downing — unprecedented between the two NATO allies — as a “regrettable incident” carried out in self-defense after repeated calls to Turkish counterparts to put away drones operating in the vicinity of the base. The incident was followed by phone calls between the two countries’ top defense officials and army chiefs to defuse the tension. “Necessary measures are being taken to ensure a more effective operation of the deconfliction mechanism with the relevant parties,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said Friday.

That said, the United States maintains the dilemma of acknowledging Turkey’s right to fight the PKK while opposing any moves that would disrupt the status quo in northeastern Syria. This attitude may not be stopping Turkey from conducting air raids, but it prevents the ripening of conditions for a Turkish ground offensive. 

Shortly after the calls between Ankara and Washington, Turkey employed warplanes to continue its airstrikes, signaling that it is bent on paralyzing the Kurdish-led autonomous administration by inflicting it with as much damage as possible.

No restraints on Iraq

As for Iraq, there is no party to restrain Turkey there. Although Ankara places importance on Baghdad’s Development Road project that would connect Basra to the Turkish border, it has typically turned a deaf ear to Iraqi protests against Turkish military operations on Iraqi soil and ignored Baghdad’s proposal for a security pact between the two countries. Ankara reckons that the PKK, which has long used bases in border areas in Iraqi Kurdistan, has expanded its presence to Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk, Makhmour and Sinjar, eyeing a route to Syria, and that neither the Iraqi Kurdish forces nor the Iraqi army are capable of dealing with it. 

For Ankara, the deployment of Iraqi guards to border areas dominated by rugged mountains and deep valleys is not a realistic measure either. Thus, Turkish forces have been erecting military outposts on hilltops in Iraqi Kurdistan’s territory for years, while expanding the areas where they maintain bases.

Washington values the stability of Iraqi Kurdistan, but beyond that, it has not sought to obstruct Turkish military operations against the PKK in the region. Given that the PKK is not on bad terms with Shiite actors in Baghdad, that Shiite militia have even helped the PKK-backed Sinjar Resistance Forces and that Tehran, too, is opposed to Turkish plans in the region, the problem for Ankara in Iraq is mostly Iran rather than the United States.

Al-Monitor