According to Kurdpress, the collapse of the indefinite detention system of ISIS affiliates in northeastern Syria, after nearly seven years, occurred suddenly and chaotically at the beginning of 2026; An event that, according to Dr. Devora Margolin, a researcher at the Washington Institute, "was both predictable and avoidable." The crisis began with the escape of about 200 male prisoners from a detention center near Al-Shadadi, and soon after, the al-Hol camp, which housed families affiliated with ISIS, was practically emptied after the escape of more than 20,000 people. At the same time, US Central Command approved the transfer of 5,700 male prisoners from Syria to Iraq.

This article warns that the detention system that was established since 2019 after the fall of the ISIS caliphate has now collapsed and its security, humanitarian and political consequences will continue not only for Syria but for the region and the world.

After the defeat of ISIS in Baghouz in 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with the support of the international coalition, arrested tens of thousands of members, supporters and families of ISIS. These people included men, women and mostly children. The detention structure was based on gender and age segregation: men and teenage boys were transferred to prisons, and women and children were sent to camps such as Al-Hol and Roj.

Margolin emphasizes that this solution was never meant to be permanent, but the reluctance of governments to return their nationals and the lack of a political solution in Syria turned the crisis into indefinite detention.

In Kurdish-controlled prisons, there were severe humanitarian and security problems: inadequate buildings, lack of medical infrastructure, lack of trained forces, and lack of international supervision were among these problems. In 2021, the United Nations declared that these centers were "unsuitable from a humanitarian and security point of view", but by the end of 2025, there was no noticeable change.

ISIS also considered these prisons as a strategic target. In 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi asked ISIS forces to release the prisoners. In January 2022, a major attack on Al-Sanaa (Panorama) prison in Hasaka was carried out with the participation of more than 200 attackers and a car bomb; An incident that showed how fragile and vulnerable these centers are.

One of the most sensitive issues was the detention of children and teenagers. Hundreds of teenage boys, some as young as 14, were imprisoned alongside adult men. Others were transferred to so-called "rehabilitation" centers such as Hori and Orkesh. The author describes this process as "prison conveyor belt"; Because these teenagers were often sent to prison again after reaching the age of 18.

The situation was critical in al-Hol camp. At the end of 2025, this camp had a population of about 24,000 people, more than 60% of whom were under 18 years old. UNICEF and relief organizations have repeatedly warned that children are exposed to violence, extremism, malnutrition and no future. In 2022, Save the Children described al-Hol as "per capita, one of the most dangerous places in the world for children."

Despite these conditions, the process of repatriating foreigners was very slow. Of nearly 4,000 foreign nationals returned between 2019 and 2025, more than 70% were children, 19% were women, and only 2.5% were men. This statistic shows that governments practically refused to accept men and even teenage boys.

The author believes that the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in December 2024 and the coming to power of Ahmad al-Shara created an opportunity for change, but at the same time created a new security vacuum. In the new round, the Trump administration also followed the reduction of the US military presence and handing over the responsibility of the detention centers to Damascus; According to this article, the action was carried out without the sufficient capacity and will of Syria, and the result was "chaos."

In January 2026, when the Syrian army entered the northeastern regions, conflict, rumors and confusion began. Al-Shadadi Prison witnessed the escape of prisoners, and Al-Hol also went out of control after the retreat of Kurdish-led forces. Within a few weeks, the population of about 20,000 people of Al-Hol disappeared, and a large part of them are now unaccounted for.

According to the author, some of the former residents of al-Hol have gone to Idlib and Aleppo, some may be planning to return to their countries, and some may be attracted to the secret networks of ISIS. This situation has created a more diffuse and difficult to track threat.

On the other hand, the 5,700 prisoners transferred to Iraq have also created a new problem. Iraq faces overcrowded prisons, sectarian tensions, a history of large-scale escapes, and the use of the death penalty. The article warns that if these prisons are attacked, the experience of the revival of ISIS during the "break the walls" period may be repeated.

In the end, Margolin concludes, the international community is faced with a dilemma: either abandon the case and face its consequences, or take concerted cooperation, return of nationals, legal trials, rehabilitation of children, and new security management. He emphasizes: "ISIS has shown in the past that it uses the escape of prisoners and its network of supporters to rebuild and expand."