According to KurdPress, with the approval of the Framework Law in the Turkish Parliament, the legal process of ending the armed conflict between the government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has entered a new phase. The law provides a legal framework for the government's next steps after Abdullah Öcalan's call for "peace and a democratic society" on February 27, 2025, and the PKK's decision to disband and lay down its arms.However, according to Levent Koker, a Turkish political science professor and lawyer who interviewed Amarci, the new law is more of a limited tool to end the armed conflict than a solution to the Kurdish issue or the democratization of Turkey.

Koker makes a fundamental distinction between ending the armed conflict and resolving the Kurdish issue. In his view, the new law could help end the war between the government and the PKK, but it does not provide any direct mechanism to resolve the Kurdish issue, which has its roots in the past century. The law also does not change the structure of the Turkish constitution or the existing mechanisms for democratizing the country.

The Turkish government has defined the goal of the current process as a “Turkey without terrorism,” a goal that focuses primarily on the dissolution of the PKK and the end of its armed activities.But Öcalan had spoken of “peace and a democratic society” in his call. From this perspective, the end of violence is only the beginning and the ultimate goal should be to resolve the Kurdish issue and move towards the establishment of a “democratic republic”. Therefore, Law No. 7595 should be seen as the first step on a long path, not the end of the peace process.

One of the most important parts of the law is the provision for the postponement of the execution of sentences and some judicial procedures for individuals who fall within the framework of the PKK dissolution and weapons surrender process. According to this law, the execution of definitive prison sentences of up to 15 years is postponed for five years and sentences of more than 15 years for 10 years. If the individual does not commit another crime during this period, the crime and its related punishment will also disappear along with its legal effects.Coker believes that although the law does not officially use the word “amnesty”, these provisions are similar in nature to a special amnesty and ultimately a conditional general amnesty. The law was approved by 467 votes of deputies, while the Turkish constitution requires at least three-fifths of the votes of all deputies to approve a general or special amnesty. Therefore, the mere refusal of the legislator to use the term “amnesty” does not necessarily change the legal nature of the provisions.

However, this same issue could become a legal issue in the future. If provisions that are de facto amnesties are implemented only for PKK and KCK-related crimes and prisoners who have committed similar crimes are excluded from them, there is a possibility of raising the objection of discrimination and unconstitutionality.

Another important ambiguity concerns the date of June 1, 2005; the date that coincides with the implementation of the new Turkish Penal Code.The law does not provide a clear explanation for why this date was chosen. Coker believes that this date is important because it can be linked to the situation of Abdullah Öcalan. The acts attributed to him occurred before this date and therefore the new law does not change his legal status.

The most important guarantee of the law concerns those who serve a five- or 10-year period of suspension of sentence without committing a new crime. In this case, the sentence is considered to have expired and no further legal issues remain regarding the acts covered by the law. However, this guarantee is limited and cannot, on its own, provide the legal security needed for a sustainable transition from armed struggle to democratic politics. One of Coker’s most serious warnings also concerns the anti-terrorism laws. He believes that the definition of a “terrorist crime” in Turkey lacks the necessary legal certainty, and the experience of recent years has shown that changing government policy can change the way these laws are interpreted and implemented. Therefore, even if former PKK membersThe new law does not provide complete immunity from future terrorism-related charges after returning to democratic politics.

For this reason, in Coker’s view, the end-of-conflict law should be accompanied by a broad reform of the criminal code, especially the anti-terrorism law. The persistence of laws and mechanisms that have been used in the past to restrict political activity could pose one of the most significant threats to the transition from armed struggle to democratic politics.

Coker also does not see the Kurdish issue as simply a question of “identity.” In his view, the issue goes deeper than a dispute over ethnic identity and is related to the political and legal structure of Turkey, a structure that has not adequately recognized ethnic, religious, ideological, gender, and class differences throughout the history of the republic.From this perspective, reducing the Kurdish issue to “identity politics” prevents us from understanding its political and legal roots.

He links this situation to the structure of the Turkish constitution since 1924, which is based on a nationalist definition of state and society and has provided the basis for policies based on assimilation and failure to recognize differences over the past decades.

Therefore, a sustainable solution, according to Coker, requires the creation of a new constitutional basis; one that recognizes the differences existing in Turkish society on the basis of the principle of equal respect. The realization of such a change also requires a broad social agreement on a new democratic foundation.

Overall, he believes that Law No. 7595 can help end the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, but ending the conflict is not the same as solving the Kurdish issue.The law neither changes the structure of the constitution, nor amends the anti-terrorism laws, nor creates the necessary guarantees for the democratization of Turkey.

However, Coker does not see the passage of the law as a purely negative development. In his opinion, the end of the conflict could pave the way for the gradual abandonment of the “fight against terrorism” as a justification for some repressive measures, and shift the conflict from the military to the political and legal arena.

The test of the usefulness of the law will not be when it is passed, but in how it is implemented; whether returnees will enjoy real legal security, whether the powers of the board and the executive will be limited and subject to oversight, whether the anti-terrorism laws will be amended, and whether real steps will be taken to resolve the Kurdish issue and democratize Turkey after the conflict ends.In this context, the new law can be seen as the beginning of a post-war phase; a phase in which the success of the peace process will no longer be measured by the number of weapons surrendered, but by the extent of political rights, civil liberties, and legal guarantees created for society. If the goal is truly to achieve “peace and a democratic society,” the end of the war is only the first condition; the main issue is to build a political and legal order that can sustain peace.