According to Kordpress, after the appointment of Tom Barak as Donald Trump's special representative for Iraq and Syria, a number of analysts and observers of Kurdish and Iraqi issues have expressed their views and concerns on X social network. These comments mainly focus on concerns about the strengthening of centralism in Baghdad and Damascus and the possible threat to Kurdish federalism and self-governance, especially in Iraq. The concern of this category is more than anything related to Barak's view on the issue of "powerful central government" and the future of federal and self-governing structures in the region.

Kamal Chumani, an analyst of Kurdish issues, believes that every stance and even every message of Barak on social networks creates new anxiety in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and among the Kurds. According to him, many Kurds see Barak's return as Trump's special representative as a "nightmare" because he sees the solution to the Middle East crises in the creation of "a powerful central government, an army, and a single sovereignty"; A model that, from the point of view of many Kurds, has repeatedly led to the suppression of minorities and authoritarian centralism in the history of the Middle East.

Referring to the experience of countries in the region, from Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein, and Syria under the Assad family, Chumani argues that the concentration of power in the hands of charismatic leaders has not only not created stable stability, but has led to coups, violence, repression, and even genocide. He says the Kurds are worried that the Trump administration's Middle East policy, led by Barak, will move away from supporting democratization and participatory structures and move towards strengthening centralized governments and powerful leaders.

According to this analyst, the Kurds' concern is not limited to Syria. He warns that just as Barak's policies in Syria led to weakening the position of the Kurds in the northeast of this country, now it is likely that the same approach will be followed in Iraq. Especially if Baghdad moves towards more centralization with the support of Washington. Chomani reminds that Iraqi Kurds have experienced genocide and severe repression during Saddam's regime, and after 1991 and then the 2003 Iraqi Constitution, they were able to establish their federal status and autonomy. From his point of view, any weakening of federalism will not only be a threat to the Kurdistan region but also a danger to the entire democratic process of Iraq.

On the other hand, Hamza Haddad, an Iraqi political analyst, has a more cautious view of these concerns. He emphasizes that despite the continuous differences between Baghdad and Erbil, the federal structure of Iraq is still based on the political agreement between the Shiite majority and the Kurds, and there is no serious will to cancel the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region in Baghdad. Haddad believes that the developments in Syria have even made many Iraqi players understand the value of relative stability and the federal system of Iraq.

He warns that Baghdad and Erbil should not return to eliminationist patterns. According to him, the experience of the policy known as the "sixty percent solution" of the United States in 2004 and 2005 - which was based on the coalition of Shiites and Kurds and ignoring the Sunnis - eventually led to the Iraqi civil war, and now any policy based on exclusion or excessive concentration can have dangerous consequences for the stability of Iraq.

At the same time, Faisal Estrabadi, an analyst and former Iraqi diplomat, also emphasizes that the differences between Baghdad and Erbil are a natural part of federal systems and should not be interpreted as the collapse of the autonomy structure of Kurdistan. He believes that the experience of the past years has shown that Iraqi federalism is still viable, despite all the crises, and unlike Syria, there is a relative political consensus in Iraq about the continuation of this structure.

On the other hand, Diliman Abdul Qadir, the supervisor of Kurdish issues, warns that the Kurdistan Region must integrate the Peshmerga forces as soon as possible and strengthen its autonomy structure, because otherwise it may be weakened in regional and international deals. He believes that the experience of Syrian Kurdistan has shown that Barak considers the Syrian model to be a successful example and may want to follow a similar model in Iraq.

Abdul Qadir says that only diplomatic smiles and official meetings are not enough to protect the achievements of the Kurds and the leaders of the region should focus on internal cohesion and maintaining their defense power more than before. According to him, the main danger is that the Kurds will become a secondary issue in the framework of larger agreements between Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus.

In general, the reactions to the appointment of Tom Barak show that part of the political and media environment of the Kurds see his return as a sign of a possible change in the American approach to the Kurdish issue and the future of federalism in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, some Iraqi analysts believe that the political structure of Iraq and the internal agreement between the main actors will prevent any foreign power from easily changing the equation of Iraqi federalism.